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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

UPON FURTHER REVIEW: RUSH PRUDENTIAL HMO, INC. v.
MORAN AND A NEW ERA OF MANAGED CARE ORGANIZATION
LIABILITY

ALLEN D. ALLRED* AND DON L. DANIEL**

I. INTRODUCTION
As managed care organizations (“MCOs”) assume an increasingly
important role in the delivery of healthcare services to patients,1 they find
themselves prime targets of, among others, federal and state policymakers,
plaintiffs’ attorneys and consumer/patient rights activists. Many health care
industry insiders believe the increased attention has had negative consequences
for consumers of health care services. The president of the American
Association of Health Plans (“AAHP”), for example, has stated that “reckless
* Mr. Allred is a partner in the firm of Thompson Coburn LLP, St. Louis, Missouri, and is cochairman of the firm’s health care practice group. Mr. Allred concentrates his practice in
healthcare and civil litigation representing managed care organizations, hospitals, integrated
healthcare delivery systems and other healthcare providers. He has extensive experience in
representing healthcare clients both at the trial and appellate levels, and is a frequent writer and
lecturer on healthcare and civil litigation topics. Mr. Allred was chairman for three years of the
Healthcare Liability and Litigation Committee of the American Health Lawyers Association.
Additionally, he is a member of the American Bar Association (Health Law and Litigation
Sections) and the Missouri and Illinois Bar Associations (Health and Civil Trial Practice
Sections). Mr. Allred received his bachelor’s degree from the University of Wisconsin and his
Juris Doctor from St. Louis University School of Law where he was a member of the Law
Journal.
** Mr. Daniel is an associate in the firm of Thompson Coburn LLP, St. Louis, Missouri, and is a
member of the firm’s health care practice group. Mr. Daniel received his bachelor’s degree from
St. Louis University and his Juris Doctor from St. Louis University School of Law where he was
editor-in-chief of the St. Louis University Public Law Review.
Special thanks to Milada Goturi, Brad Crandall and Rita Kazembe, associates,
Thompson Coburn LLP, for their assistance in researching and drafting this article.
1. Studies indicate that as many as 170-180 million Americans are enrolled in MCOs. See
National Conference of State Legislatures, Managed Care Insurer Liability, at
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/liable.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2002). See also Clive Riddle,
The Future of Managed Care: An Outline, Managed Care On-Line, at www.mcareol.com/
mcolfre1/cresem.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2002). Other surveys indicate that up to 88% of all
Americans with private health insurance are enrolled in a managed care plan (up from just 27% in
1988).
Alliance For Retired Americans, Patients’ Bill of Rights, available at
http://www.retiredamericans.org (last visited Dec. 26, 2002).
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litigation” is among the chief challenges facing the United States health care
system,2 and cites a recent AAHP-commissioned Pricewaterhouse Coopers
analysis (“PWC Report”) which concluded that 27 cents of every new dollar
spent on health care in 2001 was “driven by litigation, government mandates
and regulation and waste, fraud and abuse.”3 The net result, according to the
survey, was an added cost to the health care system of approximately $18
billion in 2001.4
While it is clear that there are many factors which have led to increases in
consumer health care costs, the extent to which any one factor is more
responsible than others is certainly debatable. Nevertheless, a quick glance at
the recent legal “headlines” leaves little doubt that MCOs are being forced to
expend increasingly significant amounts of time and money in the defense of,
among other things, complex medical malpractice and class action lawsuits.5
In the span of just one month in early 2002, for example, “The medical
societies of New Jersey, South Carolina and Tennessee filed separate lawsuits
accusing some of the nation’s largest health plans of engaging in illegal
business practices.”6
The dramatic increase in health care system regulation/litigation has had
some incredible effects:
 During 2001-2002, employers’ health care costs increased an average
of 13.7%;
 Annual health care insurance premiums for employees and retirees
increased an estimated 13% in 2001;
 The median malpractice award increased 43% in 2000 to $1 million;
and

2. HMO Trade Group Cites Challenges in Health Care System,” Reckless Litigation”
Among Them, MEALEY’S MANAGED CARE LIABILITY REP., June 14, 2002, at 1.
3. Id.
4. Id. According to Karen Ignagni, President of AAHP, ‘“[These] resources alone could
have provided coverage to 6.8 million Americans.’” Id.
5. See Acad. of Med. of Cincinnati v. Aetna Health, Inc., No. A0204947 (Ohio Cir. Ct.,
July 27, 2002); Acad. of Med. of Cincinnati v. Aetna Health, Inc., No. 02-C1-903 (Ky. Cir. Ct.,
July 27, 2002). The two previously cited cases are proposed class actions filed on June 27, 2002
alleging that four health plans participated in an “anti-competitive and illegal combination or
conspiracy in restraint of trade” to fix physician reimbursement rates. See also Chester County
Hosp. v. Independence Blue Cross, No. 02-CV-2746 (E.D. Pa., May 8, 2002) (a class action suit
filed wherein a hospital alleges the region’s largest insurer has violated antitrust and other laws by
“abusing its dominant market power,” and seeks more than $20 million in damages and other
injunctive relief.)
6. Laura B. Benko, States of Frustration; More Medical Groups Step Up Battle Against
Insurers, MODERN HEALTHCARE, May 20, 2002, at 16, 16 (2002).
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 Malpractice insurance premiums increased from 20% to 100% for some
providers.7
Indeed, large verdicts awarded under emerging theories of managed care
liability have caused some to forecast managed care litigation as “the tobacco
litigation of the turn of the century.”8
The statistics set forth above tell only part of the story. Increased costs
lead to fewer employers offering health benefits for employees, and many of
those employers who continue to offer such benefits must demand additional
contributions from employees to cover rising expenses. Ultimately all of this
results in (a) fewer Americans having health insurance coverage (some
estimate that 300,000 people lose coverage for every one-percent increase in
premiums), and (b) shortages in quality medical care as physicians and other
health care providers deal with skyrocketing malpractice premiums.9
Unfortunately for MCOs and benefit plan administrators, the surge in
litigation (as well as the inevitable increase in litigation costs) coincides with
an erosion of traditional protections from liability once afforded to such
entities. Thus while MCOs struggle to find ways to control the costs of
providing high quality medical care, the very mechanisms used to control such
costs are increasingly being opened to scrutiny and attack in the courts and
legislatures.
A recent and important example of the judiciary’s newfound willingness to
disregard liability protections once relied upon by MCOs can be seen in the
Supreme Court’s controversial 5-4 decision in Rush-Prudential HMO, Inc. v.
Moran.10 While this case will be discussed in greater detail in this Article’s
section on ERISA, it is sufficient to note for purposes of this Introduction, that
whereas health plans and their medical directors were once granted a great
amount of deference for discretionary medical coverage decisions, Rush
appears to stand for the proposition that, under state law, independent
physician reviewers can make medical necessity decisions that will be binding

7. Louise Kertesz, What is Fueling the Increase in Health Care Costs?, HEALTHPLAN
MAG., Aug. 15, 2002, at http://www.aahp.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Inside_AAHP/
Healthplan_Magazine/What. . .S.
8. Michael Higgins, Second Opinions on HMOs, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1999, at 60, 62.
Interestingly enough, Richard Scruggs (the Pascagoula, Mississippi, lawyer who pioneered the
“big tobacco” litigation), together with David Boies (who handled the federal government’s case
against Microsoft), are leading an assault on the HMO industry, charging several top managed
care companies with racketeering.
9. See American Association of Health Plans, Class Action Litigation Against the Managed
Care Industry, at http://www.classactioncenter.org/legal/litigation.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2002).
Medical care shortages are especially acute in areas where such care is needed most (for example,
rural and economically depressed areas). Id.
10. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 122 S. Ct. 2151 (2002).
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on MCOs and licensed health insurers.11 MCOs are now facing the prospect of
having to adapt their medical management decision-making processes to
account for physician review standards that may vary greatly among the
states.12
Perhaps more disturbing for MCOs and benefit plan administrators than
the actual decision in Rush is the fact that the decision appears to be just
another step in a judicial trend of upholding state laws that negatively impact
the ability of MCOs to administer health plans in a uniform manner across the
states. The bottom line appears to be, of course, that MCOs, employers and,
ultimately, consumers of health care services, can expect to see continuing
increases in costs.
In this Article, we provide an analysis of significant ongoing liability
issues for MCOs (especially in light of recent developments such as the Rush
decision), as well as an outline of “emerging” areas of MCO liability. In Part
II, we provide a brief summary of ERISA and an analysis of the courts’ trend
towards upholding state laws that once would have been preempted. Part III is
an outline of “traditional” areas of MCO liability, including direct liability (for
example, negligent supervision/retention of physicians), vicarious liability (for
example, medical malpractice), tortious interference with contract and breach
of warranty. Part IV focuses on RICO and the slew of class action claims filed
against MCOs several years ago, as well as the status of certification of new
classes. Finally, Part V examines the theories behind developing areas of
MCO liability including antitrust, utilization review and provider de-selection.
II. IMPACT OF ERISA ON MCO LIABILITY
A.

Overview of ERISA and the ERISA “Preemption” Clause

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) was enacted in
1974 to protect the pension plan assets of American workers from
misappropriation by corporate and union pension plan managers.13 “ERISA
applies to all employee pension, health, and other benefit plans established by
private sector employers (other than churches) or by employee organizations
such as unions.”14 As a result, virtually all privately-employed Americans who
11. Joel L. Michaels & Robin J. Bowen, Rush to Judgment? An Analysis of Rush Prudential
HMO, Inc. v. Moran, HEALTH L. DIG., Aug. 2002, at 24, 28.
12. Id.
13. See SARA ROSENBAUM, AN OVERVIEW OF MANAGED CARE LIABILITY: IMPLICATIONS
FOR PATIENT RIGHTS AND FEDERAL AND STATE REFORM, at ii (2001). See also Patricia Mullen
Ochmann, Managed Care Organizations Manage to Escape Liability: Why Issues of Quantity vs.
Quality Lead to ERISA’s Inequitable Preemption of Claims, 34 AKRON L. REV. 571, 580-81
(2001).
14. PATRICIA A. BUTLER, ERISA PREEMPTION MANUAL FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY
MAKERS 5 (2000).
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receive health benefits as part of their employment are covered by an ERISA
plan.
ERISA does not require “employers to establish employee benefit plans,”
nor does it mandate the “benefits employers must provide if they to choose to
offer such a plan.”15 While ERISA generally regulates the structure and
operation of pension plans, employers are granted “broad discretion over the
design of their health plans,” including discretion over whether health care
coverage for employees will be obtained through managed care companies.16
“[D]rafted . . . in reaction to an environment of failed [multi-state] pension
plans and the economic dangers associated with mass forfeiture,”17 ERISA was
enacted in an effort to establish uniformity in the regulation of benefit plan
administration. To accomplish this objective, Congress included in ERISA a
“preemption” clause which provides that ERISA shall supersede “conflicting
or inconsistent state and local regulations.”18 Peculiar in its strength, the
ERISA preemption clause has been interpreted to preempt not only conflicting
state laws that regulate ERISA health plans, but also state laws that merely
“relate” to such plans.19 As a result, ERISA historically has been held to
displace even state regulation that is compatible with federal regulation of
health care benefit plans.20
Obtaining ERISA preemption is important for MCOs (particularly in areas
such as medical malpractice) because ERISA remedies are generally limited to
either the cost of the denied benefit or injunctive relief.21 ERISA precludes
punitive damages and damages to make the beneficiary ‘whole’ from denial of
medical treatment.22 Further, if a plan participant dies as a result of an MCO’s
decision to deny benefits, there generally is no remedy available under
ERISA.23

15. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 266-27 (2000).
16. ROSENBAUM, supra note 13, at 8 (citing Pegram, 530 U.S. at 225-26).
17. Sharon Reece, The Circuitous Journey to the Patients’ Bill of Rights: Winners and
Losers, 65 ALB. L. REV. 17, 20 (2001).
18. Ochmann, supra note 13, at 581 (citing 120 Cong. Rec. 29, 197 and 29, 933 (1974)
(quoting Sen. Williams)).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).
20. Margaret G. Farrell, ERISA Preemption and Regulation of Managed Health Care: The
Case for Managed Federalism, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 251, 261 (1997) (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co.
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985); Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 98-100
nn. 18-20 (1983)).
21. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000).
22. June M. Sullivan, Overcoming the ERISA Barrier to Recovery Against HMOs: Current
Trends and Legislation, 4 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 245, 254 (2001) (citing Jane M. Mulcahy,
The ERISA Preemption Question: Why Some HMO Members are Dying for Congress to Amend
ERISA, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 877, 881 (1999)).
23. Mulcahy, supra note 22, at 883.
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It is important to clarify that ERISA specifically “saves” state insurance
regulation but exempts employee benefit plans from regulation as insurance.24
For example, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., held that
New York’s Human Rights Law forbidding discrimination in employee benefit
plans on the basis of pregnancy, and its Disability Benefits Law requiring
employers to pay sick-leave benefits to employees unable to work because of
pregnancy, were preempted by ERISA because they “relate to” employee
benefit plans.25 In contrast, the Supreme Court, in Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co. v. Massachusetts, held that a Massachusetts statute requiring certain
minimum mental-health-care benefits to be provided to Massachusetts
residents insured under a general health insurance policy or employee benefit
plan was not preempted by ERISA so far as it applied to the insurance policy
and not the employee benefit plan itself.26
By the late 1980s, courts were broadly interpreting ERISA’s “relate to”
language to preempt state-based tort liability for tortious administration of
employee benefits.27 Examples include Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux
(Supreme Court held that a Mississippi common-law cause of action arising
from “improper processing of a claim for benefits” was preempted by
ERISA),28 and Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc. (U.S. District Court for
Eastern District of Louisiana held that ERISA preempts a state-based tort claim
against an MCO and limits recovery for the death of a newborn to the costs of
the care recommended by the plaintiff’s physician and denied by the utilization
reviewer)..29
With respect to the preemption of state-based tort claims against benefit
plan administrators and MCOs, the Corcoran case established a standard that
would hold for several years.30 An example of the reach of the Corcoran
rationale can be seen in the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Kuhl v. Lincoln
National Health Plan.31 In Kuhl, the plaintiff was denied bypass surgery on
the grounds that it was determined medically unnecessary.32 The plaintiff was
awarded benefits upon adjudication, but had progressed to the point of needing
a transplant.33 The plaintiff died while adjudicating the transplant issue, and

24. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2000).
25. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-98 (1983).
26. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739-746 (1985).
27. Wayne Blackmon, The Emerging Convergence of the Doctrine of Informed Consent and
the Judicial Reinterpretation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 19 J. LEGAL MED.
377, 380 (1998).
28. 481 U.S. 41 (1985).
29. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
30. Blackmon, supra note 27, at 381.
31. 999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993).
32. Id. at 300.
33. Id.
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the benefit plan was found liable only for costs of care denied.34 By the time
of the Kuhl case, ERISA had come to be recognized as a basis for dismissing
state-based tort claims against plan administrators and MCOs that were based
on wrongful denial of benefits or wrongful interference with benefits.35
B.

Erosion of the ERISA Preemption

For over two decades, MCOs and plan administrators have relied on
ERISA preemption and an almost literal interpretation of its “relate to”
language to “insulate themselves from inflamed state court juries relying upon
state statutory or common law bad faith doctrines and special interest groups or
active insurance commissioners who sought to undermine the uniformity of the
benefit programs of multistate employers.”36 While the ERISA preemption
clause has received intense judicial scrutiny almost since its inception,37
several Supreme Court decisions in the mid-1980s justified such reliance by
virtue of their broad interpretation and application of the preemption.38
By the mid 1990s, however, the Court began indicating dissatisfaction with
its previously liberal interpretation of ERISA’s “relate to” language (as
established in the Shaw line of cases), thus signaling the beginning of a gradual
erosion of the ERISA preemption.39 In three cases commonly referred to as
the “Travelers Trilogy”40—New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.,41 California Division of Labor
Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Construction, N.A., Inc.,42 and DeBuono
v. NYSA-ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund 43—the Court seized upon
language in Shaw indicating that “some state actions may affect employee
benefit plans in too tenuous, remote or peripheral a manner to warrant a
finding that the law ‘relates to’ the plan.”44

34. Id. at 300-01.
35. Blackmon, supra note 27, at 381.
36. Edward A. Scallet, ERISA Preemption—Is it Still a Viable Doctrine? (Jan. 6, 1999), at
http://www.insurancelegal.com/erisa199.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2002).
37. Ochmann, supra note 13, at 582-83. See also Torrin A. Dorros & T. Howard Stone,
Implications of Negligent Selection and Retention of Physicians in the Age of ERISA, 21 AM. J.L.
& MED. 383, 401 (1995). In 1992, Justice Stevens reported that “[a] recent LEXIS search
indicated that there [were] . . . over 2,800 judicial opinions addressing ERISA pre-emption,”
District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 135 n.3 (1995).
38. Scallet, supra note 36 (citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983) and Pilot
Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1985)).
39. Blaire S. Osgood, Note, The Treachery of the ERISA Preemption: Ceci N’est Pas Une
Benefits Determination, 81 B.U. L. REV. 867, 871 ( 2001).
40. Id.
41. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
42. 519 U.S. 316 (1997).
43. 520 U.S. 806 (1997).
44. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983).
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First, in Travelers, commercial insurers of ERISA plans challenged a New
York State rate scheme that imposed surcharges on hospital and HMO rates for
ERISA plan participants for purposes of funding a Blue Cross rate program.45
The Court rejected the Second Circuit’s holding that the surcharges “related
to” ERISA plans because they imposed an economic burden on plan
administration,46 and instead adopted the position that Congress did not intend
to preempt state law and, therefore, “clear and manifest” congressional intent
would be required before federal preemption of state action in areas of
“traditional state regulation” would be allowed.47
Examining ERISA’s “relate to” language, the Court in Travelers
hypothesized that “really, universally, relations stop nowhere,”48 and, as such,
almost any state law could be deemed to relate to ERISA. That being the case,
the Court determined that ERISA preemption should be determined in light of
the “objectives” of the ERISA statute, rather than its “unhelpful” text.49 Upon
examination of the Congressional Record, the Court concluded that “the basic
thrust of the pre-emption clause . . . was to avoid a multiplicity of regulation in
order to permit the nationally uniform administration of employee benefit
plans.”50 Applying such rationale to the facts at hand, the Court concluded that
the New York State surcharge on ERISA plan hospital and HMO rates was an
indirect influence that could affect a benefit plan’s shopping decisions, but the
surcharge would not bind plan administrators to any particular choice. As
such, the Court held that the New York State law did not “relate to” ERISA
because the surcharge did not preclude uniform benefit plan administration or
the provision of a uniform interstate benefit package if a plan wished to
provide one.51
Two years later, the Court handed another victory to the states in
California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham
Construction, N.A., Inc.52 Continuing its dramatic shift from a broad, literal
interpretation of the term “relates” as used in Section 514 of ERISA, to a more
narrow interpretation focused on the impact of state law on the structure and
choices of an ERISA benefit plan,53 the Court considered a California statute
that permits contractors to pay less than the prevailing wage to apprentices

45. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. at 649.
46. Id. at 654.
47. Id. at 654-55.
48. Id. at 655 (quoting HENRY JAMES, RODERICK HUDSON, at xli (1980)).
49. Id. at 656.
50. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S.
645, 657 (1995).
51. Id. at 659.
52. 519 U.S. 316 (1996).
53. Blackmon, supra note 27, at 381.
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who are enrolled in state-approved apprenticeship programs.54 The Court said
that while the California law has an economic impact on ERISA plans, such
economic impact is too tenuous a relationship to justify preemption of a state
law.55 Significantly, the Court’s opinion in Dillingham advances the
presumption that Congress did not intend to preempt state law in areas of
traditional state regulation.56
Finally, in DeBuono, the Supreme Court went a step further and held that
even a direct tax on an ERISA plan does not require a finding of preemption of
state law.57 According to the Court, the party advancing a theory of ERISA
preemption “bear[s] the considerable burden of overcoming the starting
presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law.”58 In stark
contrast to pre-Travelers cases (where MCOs typically could rely on the courts
to preempt claims of medical malpractice and negligence against MCOs based
on the theory that such claims “related to” ERISA benefit plans), DeBuono
reinforces the emerging commitment of the Court to preserve state law in areas
of traditional state regulation, including the practice of medicine.59
The Travelers line of cases clearly represents a dramatic shift in the
Court’s application of ERISA preemption to state law. While one can
justifiably conclude that, prior to the Travelers cases, courts began with a
presumption that ERISA preempts state law, it seems clear that defendants in
post-Travelers actions must present clear evidence that the state law at issue
conflicts with ERISA in order to obtain preemption.
C. The Quality vs. Quantity Distinction
Injured patients seeking tort recovery from MCOs for the alleged actions
or omissions of affiliated hospitals and/or physicians (that is, vicarious
liability) have benefited from the continued weakening of the ERISA
preemption clause.60 In Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc.,61 the Third Circuit
consolidated two federal district court cases alleging medical malpractice.62
One of the lower court cases involved a widowed spouse’s claim that her

54. Dillingham Construction, 519 U.S. at 319. While apprenticeship programs are not
traditionally thought of as a “benefit,” ERISA specifically states that they are covered by the act,
and subject to all its requirements.
55. Id. at 334.
56. Id.
57. DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund. 520 U.S. 806, 809 (1997).
58. Id. at 814.
59. Osgood, supra note 39, at 874.
60. Please note that vicarious liability, as a cause of action against MCOs, is discussed in
greater detail in Part III of this Article.
61. 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995).
62. Id. at 351.
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husband’s death was due to the refusal of a hospital to perform a blood test,63
and the other alleged that an MCO was vicariously liable for the failure of its
network physicians to diagnose and treat a condition which caused an infant to
be delivered stillborn.64
After U.S. Healthcare was sued under state law (in both lower court cases
cited above), it removed the cases to federal court, arguing that each case was
completely preempted by ERISA.65 U.S. Healthcare contended that removal
was proper because treatment had been provided as a benefit under an ERISA
plan, and resulting state law claims relating to such plans must be completely
preempted.66 In each case, the district court agreed and dismissed the
plaintiff’s state law claims.67
Interestingly, the threshold issue considered in Dukes was procedural in
nature. In determining whether it was proper to remove the state cases to
federal court, the Court first considered whether the cases “arise under” federal
law.68 The Court noted that the question of whether a case arises under federal
law is made by examining the plaintiff’s complaint (the so-called “wellpleaded complaint rule”), and, therefore, removal based on a federal defense
ordinarily would not be proper.69 However, the Court went on to recognize
that in certain circumstances, “Congress may so completely preempt a
particular area that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is
necessarily federal in character.”70 The Supreme Court has determined that the
“complete preemption” doctrine applies to state law claims that “fit within the
scope of ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions.”71
Next, continuing its trend of strong reliance on Congressional intent when
examining ERISA preemption issues, the Dukes Court reasoned that Congress
intended to preempt state law claims concerning denial of benefits under
ERISA plans (“quantity of benefits”), but did not intend to regulate or control
issues regarding the quality of benefits received.72 Examining the facts of the
consolidated cases, the Court concluded that the state law claims involved
quality of care received rather than recovery of benefits due under the plan. As

63. Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare Sys., Inc., 848 F. Supp. 39, 40 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
64. Visconti v. U.S. Healthcare, 857 F. Supp. 1097, 1099 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
65. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 352-353.
66. Visconti, 857 F. Supp. at 1100-01.
67. Dukes, 848 F. Supp. at 42; Visconti, 857 F. Supp. at 1105.
68. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 353.
69. Id. at 353-54.
70. Id. at 353.
71. Phyllis C. Borzi, Distinguishing Between Coverage and Treatment Decisions Under
ERISA Health Plans: What’s Left of ERISA Preemption?, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 1219, 1249 (2001).
72. Karla S. Bartholomew, Note, ERISA Preemption of Medical Malpractice Claims in
Managed Care: Asserting a New Statutory Interpretation, 52 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1131, 1158
(1999) (citing Dukes, 57 F.3d at 356).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2003]

UPON FURTHER REVIEW

319

such, the Court held that removal of the state law claims to federal court was
improper because the cause of action was not completely preempted.73
Unfortunately for MCOs, the Court in Dukes did not offer guidance to
distinguish claims for denial of benefits from quality of care claims.74 Further,
because the doctrine of “complete preemption” is inevitably raised each time
an MCO seeks to remove a state law malpractice claim to federal court based
on ERISA preemption, post-Dukes courts have increasingly relied on the
ambiguous quality versus quantity distinction.75
As noted above, the ability of plaintiffs to avoid preemption of state
malpractice claims opens the door to punitive and compensatory damage
awards otherwise unattainable under ERISA. The “quality vs. quantity”
distinction established in Dukes, as well as the failure of the Court to articulate
a clear standard for making such a distinction, leaves MCOs exposed to
malpractice liability in any number of circumstances, especially those where
failure to provide a service can be characterized as either negligence (“quality
of care”) or benefit denial (“quantity of care”).
D. Rush-Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran and its Implications for ERISA
Preemption
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Rush-Prudential HMO, Inc. has
been termed “perhaps the most important ERISA preemption case to ever
come before the Supreme Court.”76 The Rush case “highlights the continuing
struggle courts have in defining concise and predictable boundaries as to the
scope of [ERISA] preemption of state laws,”77 and “will encourage more state
regulation and . . . trigger lawsuits on how far states can go to protect patients
from [adverse MCO benefit decisions].”78
In a 5-4 ruling on June 20, 2002, the Court held that ERISA does not
preempt an Illinois law requiring independent review when an HMO and a
patient disagree over whether a course of treatment is medically necessary.79
In a “major victory for HMO members and states’ rights,”80 the Court reasoned
73. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 356-57. The Third Circuit remanded the case to district court with
instructions to send the cases to state court for trial on the issue of vicarious liability of the MCO
for the actions of its health care providers. Id. at 361.
74. Bartholomew, supra note 72, at 1158.
75. Id. at 1158-59 (citing Schmid v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 963 F. Supp. 942, 944 (D.
Or. 1997); Hoyt v. Edge, No. 97-3631, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8846, at *4-7 (E.D. Pa. June 19,
1997); Roessert v. Health Net, 929 F. Supp. 343, 349-50 (N.D. Cal. 1996)).
76. Mark D. DeBofsky, Moran v. Rush-Prudential HMO, Inc.—The New Paradigm of
ERISA Preemption, at http://www.debofsky.com/moran-article.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2002).
77. Michaels and Bowen, supra note 11, at 24.
78. Marcia Coyle, HMO Outlook: More Court Action, NAT’L L.J., June 24, 2002, at A1.
79. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., v. Moran, 122 S. Ct. 2151, 2170-71 (2002).
80. ERISA Preemption: Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, HEALTH L. LITIG. REP., June 2002,
at 3.
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that independent state review panels are exempt from federal preemption
because HMOs are insurance companies subject to state regulation.81
1. Procedural Background. In this case, Rush-Prudential HMO, Inc.
denied coverage to Debra Moran, an Illinois resident, for a requested shoulder
surgery procedure. Ms. Moran opted to obtain surgery through an out-ofnetwork provider at her own expense, incurring medical expenses in excess of
$94,000.82 Ms. Moran then sued Rush in state court under the Illinois Health
Maintenance Organization Act (“Illinois HMO Act”) which requires HMOs to
(a) submit to independent physician review where there is disagreement
between plan and beneficiary over whether a course of treatment is medically
necessary, and (b) to comply with the decision of the independent physician
reviewer.83
Rush removed the case to federal court on the grounds that Moran’s claim
was preempted by ERISA and contended that the case should be decided in
accordance with ERISA’s civil enforcement provision. The district court
remanded the case to state court, however, after ruling that Moran’s request for
independent physician review under state law would not require interpretation
of the terms of the benefit plan (that is, it was not a “quantity” or “coverage”
determination) and thus her cause of action was not “completely preempted.”84
On remand, the state court ordered Rush to submit to an independent physician
reviewer in accordance with Illinois law, who in turn found that Ms. Moran’s
surgery was, in fact, “medically necessary” (based on the language of Ms.
Moran’s insurance certificate as well as the reviewer’s own medical
judgment).85 Nevertheless, Rush’s medical director rejected the decision of the
independent physician review and denied Moran’s claim.86
Next,
Moran amended her complaint in state court to seek reimbursement for [her]
surgery as “medically necessary” under [the Illinois] HMO Act, [whereupon]
Rush [once] again removed [the case] to federal court [on the grounds] that
Moran’s amended complaint stated a claim for ERISA benefits (a “quantity” or
“coverage” claim) and was thus completely preempted by ERISA’s civil
enforcement provisions.87

The federal district court granted Rush’s motion for summary judgment and
Moran appealed to the Seventh Circuit.88

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Rush, 122 S. Ct. at 2160-62.
Id. at 2156-57.
Id. at 2157.
Id.
Id.
Rush, 122 S. Ct. at 2157.
Id. at 2157-58.
Id. at 2158.
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The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that ERISA
“broadly preempts” state law which “relates to” employee benefit plans, but
noted that state laws which “regulate insurance” are “saved” from ERISA
preemption.89 In reversing the lower court, however, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that the state independent physician review provision was part of the
insurance contract between Rush and Moran and did not constitute a forbidden
“alternative remedy” to the civil enforcement provisions of ERISA.90 The
Court of Appeals reasoned that the Illinois HMO Act did not “authorize any
particular form of relief in state courts; rather, with respect to ERISA [] health
plan[s], the judgment of the independent reviewer is only enforceable in an
action brought under ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme.”91
2. Supreme Court Decision. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court
affirmed the decision of the Seventh Circuit, holding that the Illinois HMO Act
is not preempted by ERISA because: (a) the state law qualifies as a regulation
of insurance and thus is specifically “saved” from preemption,92 and (b) the
Illinois HMO Act’s independent physician review provision for coverage
disputes regarding medical necessity does not provide a remedy that conflicts
with those available under the civil enforcement provisions of ERISA.93
In determining that the Illinois HMO Act qualified as an insurance
regulation, the majority opinion (written by Justice David H. Souter) spent
significant time explaining that, while many HMOs act as both providers and
insurers, nothing in the ERISA “saving” clause94 requires an either/or choice
between provider and insurer when considering questions of state law
preemption.95 As a result, if “providing insurance fairly accounts for []
application of [the] state law, the [ERISA] saving clause may apply” and
preemption will not stand.96 According to the majority, it is unrealistic to think
of HMO-style organizations without their insurance element, and thus
preemption of the Illinois law’s independent review provision would be
contrary to ERISA’s “saving” clause.97
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Rush, 122 S. Ct. at 2158.
92. Id. at 2160-63.
93. Id. at 2170. We should note that, in the wake of Rush, the Supreme Court already
ordered the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to reconsider its decision regarding Texas’ external
review law in Montemayor v. Corporate Health Insurance, Inc., 122 S.Ct. 2617 (2002). In June
2002, the Supreme Court “directed the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to reconsider its decision in
[Montemayor].” The U.S. Supreme Court Last Week Directed the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
to Reconsider Its Decision in Montemayor v. Corporate Health Insurance, Inc., MANAGED CARE
WK., July 1, 2002, at 8.
94. See supra notes 14-35 and accompanying text.
95. Rush, 122 S. Ct. at 2160.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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Rejecting Rush’s alternative argument that the Illinois law should be
preempted on the grounds that it creates an impermissible alternative remedy
that conflicts with ERISA’s exclusive remedies (Rush actually argued that the
independent physician review provision amounted to a de facto binding
arbitration provision), the Court held that because the independent review is
limited to medical necessity decisions, it is more akin to a second opinion and
far removed from any notion of an enforcement scheme.98 Further, the court
argued that the state law does not create any form of ultimate relief that
conflicts with the type of relief obtainable in an ERISA proceeding and, as
such, the state law is not categorically preempted.99
3. Analysis. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas warns
that the ruling in Rush “eviscerates” the uniformity of ERISA remedies
because some 40 other states have similar laws, though [such laws] vary as to
applicability, procedures, standards, deadlines and consequences of
independent review.”100 According to the dissent (joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy), “allowing disparate state laws
that provide inconsistent external review requirements to govern” a plan
participant’s claim to benefits “is wholly destructive of Congress’ expressly
stated goal of uniformity in this area.”101
Indeed, it is interesting to note that in Travelers, the case which can be
viewed as the beginning of the erosion of ERISA preemption, the Court
specifically noted that Congressional intent would be the key to ERISA
preemption decisions and that “the basic thrust of the pre-emption clause . . .
was to avoid a multiplicity of regulation in order to permit the nationally
uniform administration of employee benefit plans.”102 Just as Travelers
represented a departure from the Shaw line of cases (a move from a literal
interpretation of ERISA’s “relate to” language to a focus on Congressional
intent), Rush appears to have established yet another framework for
preemption decisions. Instead of focusing on Congressional intent, the key to
preemption decisions now appears to be whether the state law at issue
establishes a new cause of action or provides for a form of relief inconsistent
with ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions.103 The only theme that appears to

98. Id. at 2168-69.
99. Id. at 2167.
100. Rush, 122 S. Ct. at 2178.
101. Id.
102. N.Y. State Conference Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S.
645, 655-57 (1995). For a full discussion of Travelers, see supra notes 45-51 and accompanying
text.
103. To illustrate this point, though in a light considerably more favorable to MCOs, see
Sprecher v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., No. 02-CV-00580, 2002 U.S. Dist. WL 1917711 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 19, 2002). In Sprecher, which was decided two months after the Supreme Court’s
decision in Rush, U.S. District Judge Ronald L. Buckwalter refused to follow a colleague’s recent
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be consistent is that the courts will consistently force MCOs to overcome a
strong presumption against preemption of state law.
While the long-term impact of Rush is still open for debate, many feel that
the Supreme Court’s decision will have a strong negative impact on managed
care. Elliot B. Pollack, co-chairman of Pullman & Comley’s health care
section (Hartford, CT) states that “[t]he language of the decision is an open
invitation to other forms of state legislation which, five years ago, one would
have said would be trampling on ERISA proscriptions.”104 According to
Sharon J. Arkin, an attorney who filed an amicus brief supporting Moran on
behalf of the California Consumer Health Care Council, the Rush decision will
impact state law in that it will give individual states an idea as to how far they
can go with external review statutes. Ms. Arkin states that approximately 50%
of independently reviewed HMO denials are reversed in California.105 The
Washington, D.C.-based Health Benefits Coalition, which represents
employers, announced its opinion that the Rush decision deals “a blow in the
battle to control the already soaring costs of health care.”106 After Rush, it is
clear that MCOs and their medical directors will have to consider their
standards for discretionary coverage decisions.
Uniformity in plan
administration, the stated goal of ERISA, appears to be unattainable in light of
the courts’ inability to adequately define the scope and parameters of ERISA
preemption.
III. GENERAL THEORIES OF LIABILITY
Generally speaking, individuals or entities failing to exercise reasonable
care in the medical treatment of patients can be held liable for injuries that
result from such negligence.107 Applying this principle in the managed care
context, MCOs often can be held liable under state common law (qualified, of
course, by ERISA’s preemption clause) not only for their own negligence, but

decision allowing ERISA plaintiffs to pursue claims under Pennsylvania’s bad faith statute. Id. at
*3. Judge Buckwalter reasoned that the Pennsylvania bad faith law (which authorized punitive
damages and interest penalties) “would significantly expand the potential scope of ultimate
liability imposed upon employers by the ERISA scheme.” Id. at *7. Buckwalter went on to hold
that “because Pennsylvania’s bad faith statute provides a form of ultimate relief in a judicial
forum that adds to the judicial remedies provided by ERISA, it is incompatible with ERISA’s
exclusive enforcement scheme.” Id.
104. Coyle, supra note 78, at A9.
105. Id.
106. David G. Savage, A Second Opinion, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2002, at 36.
107. Angela M. Easley, Comment, A Call to Congress to Amend ERISA Preemption of HMO
Medical Malpractice Claims: The Dissatisfactory Distinction Between Quality and Quantity of
Care, 20 CAMPBELL L. REV. 293, 303-04 (1998) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
283 (1965)).
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also for the negligence of their health care providers.108 The two main theories
of MCO malpractice liability are direct liability and vicarious liability.109
A.

Direct Liability

In direct liability causes of action, plaintiffs attempt to overcome ERISA
preemption by seeking to hold MCOs liable for their own actions or omissions,
as opposed to the actions or omissions of the MCO’s agents.110 Direct liability
theories generally can be divided into two categories: (1) corporate negligence
and (2) contract-based theories (including breach of contract, breach of
warranty and fraud).111
1.

Corporate Negligence

While common law principles of negligence have been applied to hospitals
for quite some time,112 only recently have courts extended the doctrine of
institutional or corporate negligence to MCOs.113 Underlying the tort of
corporate negligence is a recognition of the comprehensive role of MCOs in
the provision of health care services to their members, as well as a belief that
MCOs should have “corresponding corporate responsibilities.”114
In other words, corporate negligence is a theory that creates a nondelegable duty owed directly to the patient.115 Under such theory, MCOs owe
a duty of care to their patients “to maintain safe and adequate facilities and
equipment; to select and retain competent[] [health care providers]; to oversee
all persons who practice medicine; and to formulate, adopt and enforce
adequate rules and policies to ensure quality care for its patients.”116 A
plaintiff seeking to recover damages under a theory of corporate negligence
must show that MCOs are, in effect, practicing medicine in that they (a) are
active managers of patient care, and (b) have influence over “physicians’

108. Id. at 304.
109. Id.
110. Christine E. Brasel, Comment, Managed Care Liability: State Legislation May Arm
Angry Members With Legal Ammo to Fire at Their MCOs For Cost Containment Tactics . . . But
Could it Backfire?, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 449, 464 (1999).
111. James F. Henry, Comment, Liability of Managed Care Organizations After Dukes v.
U.S. Healthcare: An Elemental Analysis, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 681, 702 (1996)
112. See, e.g., Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem’l Hosp., 211 N.E. 2d 253 (Ill. 1965).
113. See,e.g., Jones v. Chicago HMO Ltd. of Ill., 730 N.E.2d 1119, 1128 (Ill. 2000); Shannon
v. McNulty, 718 A.2d 828 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
114. Jones, 730 N.E.2d at 1128.
115. Richard C. Miller, Breaking Down the Wall (ERISA): Theories of Recovery Against
HMOs, at http://www.mmmpalaw.com/CM/Articles/ articles27.asp (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
116. Anna M. Bamonte & Linda S. Hackett, HMO Liability Presents Risks to Physicians,
PHYSICIAN’S NEWS DIGEST (Jan. 1999), at http://www.physiciansnews.com/law/898.html (last
visited Sept. 5, 2002).
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medical treatment decisions.” Plaintiffs also must prove that their injuries
were caused directly by the negligence of the MCO.117
In the 1998 case Shannon v. McNulty, “Pennsylvania became the first
jurisdiction to hold a managed care plan directly liable for its own . . .
corporate negligence.”118 In Shannon, the plaintiff utilized an HMO-provided
emergency care telephone service staffed by triage nurses to obtain advice
regarding abdominal pains and other symptoms the plaintiff believed were
associated with preterm labor.119 After first ordering the plaintiff to consult
with her Ob-Gyn, the HMO’s telephone service staff responded to the
plaintiff’s repeated requests for additional treatment by directing her to
undergo a back examination.120 Ultimately, the plaintiff was admitted to a
hospital for a back exam, but delivered a baby who died two days later due to
severe prematurity.121
The plaintiff in Shannon brought suit against the HMO, asserting claims of
vicarious and direct liability under the corporate negligence doctrine.122
Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the HMO breached its duty to oversee
that the dispensing of advice by its telephone triage nurses would be performed
in a medically reasonable manner.123 The court relied on Thompson v. Nason
Hospital124 which, in the context of considering a hospital’s negligence, stated
four general areas of corporate liability including “a duty to oversee all persons
who practice medicine within its walls as to patient care.”125 In extending this
duty to MCOs, the Shannon court compared “the corporate hospital’s role in
the total health care of its patients” to the “central role played by HMOs in the
total health care of its subscribers.”126
Importantly, the court in Shannon held that when an HMO provides health
care services, rather than just paying for those services, it has a non-delegable
duty to render the medical decisions affecting a subscriber’s care in a
“medically reasonable” manner.127 Further, when an MCO makes a decision to
limit a subscriber’s access to treatment, “that decision must pass the test of

117. Miller, supra note 115.
118. Emmanuel O. Iheukwumere, Application of the Corporate Negligence Doctrine to
Managed Care Organizations: Sound Public Policy or Judicial Overkill?, 17 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 585, 609 (2001). See Shannon v. McNulty, 718 A.2d 828 (Pa. Super Ct.
1998)
119. Shannon, 718 A.2d at 832.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 834.
123. Id.
124. 591 A.2d 703 (Pa. 1991).
125. Id. at 707.
126. Shannon, 718 A.2d at 835.
127. Id. at 835-36.
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medical reasonableness.”128 Perhaps most ominous for MCOs, however, the
Shannon court stressed “HMOs may, under the right circumstances, be held
corporately liable for any of the Thompson duties which causes harm to its
subscribers.”129 The other Thompson duties are: (1) the duty to maintain “safe
and adequate facilities and equipment” for patients; (2) the “duty to select and
retain only competent physicians”; and (3) the “duty to formulate, adopt and
enforce adequate rules and policies to ensure quality care for patients.”130
In 2000, the Illinois Supreme Court followed Pennsylvania’s lead in Jones
v. Chicago HMO Ltd. of Illinois, where plaintiff was insured through defendant
Chicago HMO.131 At the time of the incident at issue, plaintiff was assigned a
particular primary care physician by her HMO, and such physician had
undertaken treatment of plaintiff’s infant daughter (despite the fact that the
physician was the primary care physician for at least 6000 patients).132 When
plaintiff telephoned her physician (as instructed by her HMO) to describe
symptoms her daughter had developed, the physician neglected to recommend
hospitalization and instead advised giving castor oil to the child.133 The next
day, plaintiff took her daughter to an emergency room because the infant’s
symptoms had not improved.134 The baby was diagnosed with bacterial
meningitis and was permanently disabled as a result of the illness.135
The plaintiff in Jones filed complaints against both the primary care
physician and the HMO, including a charge of corporate negligence against
Chicago HMO for, inter alia, (1) negligently assigning an overloaded physician
as the child’s primary care physician, and (2) negligently adopting procedures
that required plaintiff to contact her primary care physician before visiting his
office or seeking emergency care.136 Chicago HMO made no argument against
the extension of corporate negligence to HMOs, and the court concluded that
“the law imposes a duty upon HMOs to conform to the legal standard of
reasonable conduct in light of the apparent risk.”137 To fulfill this duty,
according to the Jones court, an HMO must act as would a “reasonably
careful” HMO under the circumstances.138
Managed care organizations also need to be cognizant of legislative
initiatives to negate ERISA preemption by extending direct liability to MCOs.

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id.
Id. at 836 (emphasis added).
Id. at 831.
Jones, 730 N.E.2d 1119, 1123 (Ill. 2000).
Id. at 1125.
Id. at 1123.
Id.
Id.
Jones v. Chicago HMO Ltd. of Ill., 730 N.E.2d at 1122-24.
Id. at 1129.
Id.
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In California, for example, the Managed Health Care Insurance Accountability
Act of 1999139 (which applies to services rendered or treatments denied after
January 1, 2001) has as its stated purpose the protection of “persons covered
by employer-sponsored health and disability plans by ensuring that health care
providers rather than HMOs are in charge of patient care.”140
The California statute makes HMOs liable for their own coverage
decisions as well as coverage decisions made by any party they contract with,
such as third party administrators or doctors.141 It imposes a duty of ordinary
care upon the HMO to arrange for the provision of “medically necessary health
services to its subscribers and enrollees, where the health care service is a
benefit provided under the plan.”142 The plan also is
liable for any and all harm legally caused by its failure to exercise ordinary
care when both of the following apply: (1) the failure to exercise ordinary care
resulting in the denial, delay, or modification of the health care service
recommended for, or furnished to, a subscriber or enrollee; and (2) the
subscriber or enrollee suffered substantial harm.143

The California statute does provide one safe harbor for HMOs. It requires
the subscriber or enrollee to exhaust the HMO’s independent review procedure
prior to bringing suit unless he or she can demonstrate that substantial harm
has occurred or will imminently occur prior to the completion of the
independent review.144 Alternatively, a participant may use California’s
independent review process for treatment denials that are based on medical
necessity where the health care service is otherwise eligible for coverage under
the plan.145
One area of direct liability which likely will see increased litigation is
corporate negligence in provider selection or supervision (negligent
credentialing and negligent retention of providers).146 Credentialing is the
means by which an MCO verifies a provider’s qualifications and reputation
prior to adding him or her to its provider panel and is one of many mechanisms
utilized by MCOs to provide quality care while controlling costs. By
instituting a thorough and complete credentialing system, MCOs minimize the
risk that subscribers will look to it to collect damages when the subscriber is
139. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3428 (West Supp. 2002).
140. Beckman, Davis, Smith & Ruddy, L.L.P., New Legislation and Statutory Amendments,
at http://www.beckmandavis.com/articles.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
141. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.30(b) (West Supp. 2002).
142. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3428(a) (West Supp. 2002).
143. Id. § 3428(a)(1)-(a)(2).
144. Id. § 3428(k)(1).
145. Id.
146. Henry, supra note 111, at 701 (citing Joanne B. Stern, Malpractice in the Managed Care
Industry, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1285, 1289-90 (1991)). See also Thompson v. Nason Hosp.,
591 A.2d 703 (Pa. 1991).
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injured due to the malpractice of a provider which the MCO held out to be
qualified.
Negligent credentialing and supervision claims typically are brought
together with ostensible agency claims for medical malpractice, “because to
prevail in a claim of negligent . . . [credentialing] or [negligent] supervision,
the plaintiff must first prove that the provider performed a negligent act.”147
Thus while a plaintiff generally will face a “double hurdle” of proving
negligence by both the provider and the MCO,148 courts have specifically held
that MCOs have a duty to conduct “reasonable investigation[s]” of the
physicians available to MCO enrollees to determine their competence and
reputation in the medical community.149 Further, at least one court has rejected
an HMO’s attempt to remove a negligent credentialing case to federal court via
ERISA’s preemption clause, finding that the negligent credentialing complaint
“attacked the quality of services rendered” by the HMO, and that state court
was a proper forum because the plaintiff’s claim “fall[s] outside the scope of
ERISA.”150
MCOs also face potential liability from suits brought by providers
claiming they were wronged in the credentialing process (wrongful termination
of membership). Unlike other areas of corporate negligence, however, MCOs
can find certain protections from this type of liability in federal and state
credentialing laws. Such “peer review” immunity laws are a “powerful
defense for credentialing entities and an almost insurmountable hurdle to
individual health care providers.”151
The primary source of peer review immunity is the Health Care Quality
Improvement Act of 1986 (“HCQIA”)152 Enacted to encourage health care
entities to conduct meaningful review of their providers, HCQIA provides
almost complete immunity to claims for monetary damages arising from
credentialing/peer review actions.153 To qualify for immunity under HCQIA,
not only must an MCO report certain adverse actions against providers to the

147. Henry, supra note 111, at 701.
148. Id.
149. McClellan v. Health Maint. Org. of Pa., 604 A.2d 1053, 1053 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
150. Dykema v. King, 959 F. Supp. 736, 741 (D.S.C. 1997).
151. Michael J. Baxter, A Potent Weapon: Federal Peer Review Immunity Under HCQIA,
available at http://www.bbsclaw.com/art_05.htm. (last visited Sept. 7, 2002).
152. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152). In addition to federal immunity under HCQIA,
many states have peer review statutes providing corresponding immunities. In certain instances,
state laws may confer even broader immunities than HCQIA (for example, the Indiana Peer
Review Act confers confidentiality on records and determinations of peer review committees).
Sherry A. Fabina-Abney & Christopher S. Sears, Why Do Managed Care Organizations Do
Credentialing, NAT’L ASS’N MED. STAFF SERVICES J., Spring 1996, available at
http://www.icemiller.com/resource_center/publications.html#health) (last visited Dec. 26, 2002).
153. Baxter, supra note 151.
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National Practitioner Data Bank,154 but it must provide a complete array of due
process rights to providers whose membership is denied, modified, suspended
or terminated.155
An MCO’s decision to deny, modify, suspend or terminate a provider’s
membership must be taken: (1) in the reasonable belief that the action was in
furtherance of quality health care; (2) after a reasonable effort to obtain the
facts of the matter; (3) after adequate notice and hearing procedures are
afforded to the physician involved, and (4) in the reasonable belief that the
action was warranted by the facts known after the investigation and hearing.156
In addition, except for emergency situations, MCOs must provide certain
notice and hearing procedures to physicians prior to making decisions which
would adversely affect a provider’s membership.157
The immunity provisions of HCQIA are extremely broad. It protects the
MCO’s credentialing committee members and any other MCO committeemembers engaged in credentialing-related activities.158 The immunity can
“halt suits against an MCO by a physician adversely affected by a
credentialing decision including suits for defamation, abuse of process,
malicious prosecution, antitrust and tortious interference with contractual
relations.”159 In fact, there is a statutory presumption of immunity which
courts have indicated must be rebutted by the party opposing the motion
raising the immunity defense.160
In light of the extension of corporate negligence to MCOs as evidenced by
the decisions in Shannon and Jones, as well as the proliferation of various
patients’ rights initiatives throughout the United States, MCOs likely can
expect further judicial and legislative efforts to extend corporate negligence
principles traditionally applied to hospitals. While corporate negligence, as it
applies to MCOs, is still the exception rather than the rule, MCOs should
consider undertaking risk management initiatives in line with the duties
154. This is a national data bank established to store malpractice claim and disciplinary
history for health care providers.
155. Fabina-Abney & Sears, supra note 152.
156. 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a) (1994).
157. Fabina-Abney & Sears, supra note 152. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11112(b)-11112(c) (1994).
These subsections essentially require that physicians be notified of a proposed adverse action.
Such notice must indicate that the physician has the right to a hearing; and that the physician must
be notified of hearing rights and which witnesses will be called. Id. These subsections also
dictate who can be the decision-maker at the hearing, right to counsel and cross-examination
rights. Id.
158. Jerry S. Sobelman, Managed Care Credentialing of Physicians, PHYSICIAN’S NEWS
DIG., June 2001, available at http://physiciansnews.com/business/601sobelman.html (last visited
Dec. 26, 2002). See also Fabina-Abney & Sears, supra note 152.
159. Fabina-Abney & Sears, supra note 152.
160. Baxter, supra note 151 (citing Goodwich v. Sinai Hosp. of Balt., 680 A.2d 1067 (Md.
1996)).
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enumerated in Thompson v. Nason Hospital (discussed supra), as well as
ensuring that they comply with any availability “immunities” such as that set
forth in HCQIA.161
2.

Contract-Based Theories

The relationship between an MCO and its enrollees is essentially one of
contract.162 MCOs may be exposed to liability for breach of contract or
warranty for failing to provide benefits or pay claims that the MCO is
obligated to provide under the terms of the agreement between the MCO and
the enrollee.163 Breach of contract claims generally are brought by plaintiffs
seeking to hold MCOs directly liable for provider negligence.164 While the
majority of direct negligence claims against MCOs assert some form of breach
of contract claim, ERISA preemption has proven to be a major hurdle for
plaintiffs.165 Nevertheless, where plaintiffs are able to prove bad faith denial
of bargained-for services, they may be successful in obtaining punitive and
compensatory damages, attorneys’ fees and interest.166
Courts have held that MCOs have a legal duty to “deal fairly and in good
faith with [subscribers], and when [they] refuse to do so without proper cause,
[they are] liable for damages flowing therefrom.”167 In McEvoy v. Group
Health Cooperative of Eau Claire,168 for example, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court considered an HMO’s denial of a subscriber’s inpatient psychological
care benefits, which were specifically provided for in the subscriber
agreement.169 The court noted that HMO subscribers are similar to insurance
policyholders in that they are in a weak bargaining position vis-à-vis their
HMO and, as such, may face bureaucratic and procedural hurdles in asserting
their contractual rights.170 Given such similarities between HMOs and
traditional insurance companies, the court extended Wisconsin’s common law
tort of bad faith to HMOs in an effort to ensure that “HMOs do not give cost

161. See supra notes 122-30 and accompanying text.
162. Brasel, supra note 110, at 466.
163. Stephen S. Rosenfeld, Managed Care Liability: Review and Update, available at
http://www.rosenfeld.com/Articles/mcl.htm, (last visited Sept. 3, 2002).
164. Id.
165. Ochmann, supra note 13, at 601.
166. See, e.g., Williams v. Health Am., 535 N.E.2d 717 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (HMO can be
liable for bad faith benefits decision); Birth Ctr. v. St. Paul Co., Inc., 787 A.2d 376 (Pa. 2001)
(compensatory damages available).
167. Richard A. Spector, Managed Health Care Liability Issues, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 311, 325
(2001-2002) (citing Rederscheid v. Comprecare, Inc., 667 P.2d 766 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988)).
168. 570 N.W.2d 397 (Wis. 1997).
169. Id. at 400.
170. Id. at 402.
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containment and utilization review such significant weight so as to disregard
the legitimate medical needs of subscribers.”171
The McEvoy court held that to prevail on a bad faith tort claim asserted
against an HMO, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to show (1) “the
absence of a reasonable basis for the HMO to deny a plaintiff’s claim for
[contracted services, and (2)] that the HMO, in denying such claim, either
knew or recklessly failed to ascertain that the coverage or care should have
been provided.”172 “When a bad faith breach occurs, the HMO is liable for any
damages which are the proximate result of that breach.”173 Should the plaintiff
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the HMO acted with fraud,
oppression or malice, then punitive damages apply.174
Managed care organizations also should be aware that subscribers are not
the only potential class of plaintiffs eligible to bring breach of contract claims
against them. In McLachlan v. Louisiana Health Service and Indemnity Co.,175
Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle of the Eastern District of Louisiana held that a claim
for breach of contract by a third-party medical provider does not arise under
ERISA.176
In McLachlan, a physician brought a breach of contract claim against Blue
Cross and Blue Shield of Louisiana (“Blue Cross”), alleging that Blue Cross
refused to pay for services rendered by the physician.177 Blue Cross removed
the case to Federal District Court, claiming that it fell “within the scope of
ERISA.”178
In remanding the case back to the First City Court of Orleans Parish, Judge
Lemelle reasoned that “ERISA [only] preempts the state law if the plaintiff’s
claim ‘relates to’ an employee benefit plan.”179 In this case, observed Lemelle,
the plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract against Blue Cross did not address
a beneficiary’s right to receive benefits under the terms of a plan.180 Further,
since plaintiff is a medical provider, his claim does not affect the relationship
between traditional ERISA parties.181 As such, Judge Lemelle held that the
plaintiff physician’s claim did not “relate to” an employee benefit plan and was
not preempted by ERISA.182

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 403.
Id. at 405 (citations omitted).
McEvoy, 570 N.W.2d at 405 (citations omitted).
Id.
No. 02-0424, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12558 (E.D. La. July 3, 2002).
Id. at *5.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *5 (citation omitted).
McLachlan, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12558, at *4.
Id. at *6-7.
Id. at *5.
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Bad faith usually implies that an MCO should have performed a function
or honored an agreement, but did not. The McEvoy case and others like it
reinforce the importance of ensuring that coverage and contractual decisions
are based on established policies and procedures that apply to all enrollees and
providers, and that such policies are strictly followed. Services that are not
covered should be communicated clearly in plan descriptions and other
materials provided to enrollees, and only services that are covered and
available under the plan should be promoted.
B.

Vicarious Liability

Vicarious liability is an agency principle which makes the master liable for
the tortious acts of his servant, despite the fact that the master has not himself
acted negligently.183 Particularly applicable to malpractice actions (as
discussed briefly in our analysis of the Dukes case supra), vicarious liability
can be subdivided into theories of respondeat superior and apparent/ostensible
agency.184
1.

Respondeat Superior

Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is vicariously
liable for the tortious acts of an employee acting within the scope of his or her
employment.185 The general theory behind this doctrine is that if employers
are held liable for the negligent acts of employees, employers will have an
incentive to invest time and resources into exercising appropriate levels of
supervision and control over their agents, or instituting prevention measures
necessary to reduce risk to acceptable levels.186
A plaintiff seeking to hold an MCO liable for a physician’s (or other
provider’s) malpractice on a theory of respondeat superior must prove that the
physician was an employee of the MCO rather than an independent contractor
and that the employee’s tortious behavior fell within the scope of his
employment.187 While an MCO model which directly employs physicians,
nurses and/or other healthcare workers (e.g., staff model HMO) is particularly
susceptible to respondeat superior liability, courts generally will focus on the
degree of control the MCO exercises over the provider (as opposed to whether

183. Brasel, supra note 110, at 460 (citing Barry R. Furrow, Managed Care Organizations
and Patient Injury: Rethinking Liability, 31 GA. L. REV. 419, 452 (1997)).
184. See supra notes 61-75 and accompanying text.
185. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 267 (1958).
186. Richard A. Epstein & Alan O. Sykes, The Assault on Managed Care: Vicarious
Liability, Class Actions and The Patient’s Bill of Rights, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 625, 636-37 (2001).
187. Brasel, supra note 110, at 461 (citing William E. Milks, Annotation, Liability of Health
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) for Negligence of Member Physicians, 51 A.L.R. 5th 271
(1997).
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an official ‘employment” relationship exists) when determining whether
respondeat superior liability is appropriate.188
Given the myriad of formal and informal “relationships” that may exist
between healthcare providers and MCOs, it is not always easy for claimants to
prove employment relationships for purposes of establishing MCO liability
under a theory of respondeat superior. However, it is not necessary to prove
that an MCO has “actual control” over a provider in order to be successful in a
respondeat superior claim; rather, the MCO must be “in a position to control
the physician.”189
When deciding whether an MCO has the requisite amount of control over a
provider such that respondeat superior liability would attach to the MCO,
courts often will consider the manner of physician selection, physician
discharge rights (that is, provider de-selection), quality control mechanisms
instituted by the MCO, and the form of compensation paid to the provider.190
Active and comprehensive utilization review mechanisms, for example, are
evidence of an MCOs intent to exercise control over physician treatment
decisions.191
With respect to compensation, and absent other mitigating factors, fee-forservice arrangements (payment for each service provided by the physician
pursuant to a contract negotiated between the MCO and the physician at arm’s
length) are indicative of an independent contractor relationship.192 In contrast,
physicians receiving salary or capitation payment compensation from an MCO
generally are regarded as employees. In a typical salary arrangement, such as a
staff-model HMO, the managed care organization institutes certain cost-control
mechanisms and physicians are motivated to adhere to such mechanisms in
order to retain their jobs and salaries.193 This degree of control over physician
decision-making is also evident in capitation payment arrangements (fixed sum
payment to physician for each patient per month in return for providing all
medically necessary service), as physicians have an incentive to increase their
profits by providing only truly necessary services.194
2.

Ostensible Agency

Even where an independent contractor relationship is found to exist
between an MCO and a provider, however, the MCO may, in certain
circumstances, be found liable on an ostensible agency theory. This doctrine
188. Id. (citing O. Mark Zamora, Medical Malpractice and Health Maintenance
Organizations: Evolving Theories and ERISA’s Impact, 19 NOVA L. REV. 1047, 1049 (1995)).
189. Id. (citing Zamora, supra note 183, at 1050).
190. Henry, supra note 111, at 701. See also Sullivan, supra note 22, at 259.
191. Henry, supra note 111, at 701.
192. Id.
193. Sullivan, supra note 22, at 260.
194. Id. at 260-61.
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provides that, where an organization (an HMO or other managed care
organization) “represents” that a healthcare provider is an agent or employee of
the organization, and causes a patient to rely on that representation when
submitting to care, the organization will be held liable for tortious acts of the
healthcare provider, regardless of the fact that an independent contractor
relationship actually exists between the organization and the provider.195
As opposed to respondeat superior claims, the key issue in ostensible
agency matters is not the degree of control the MCO exercises over the
provider, but rather how the relationship between the MCO and the provider is
represented to the health plan member.196 In Boyd v. Albert Einstein Medical
Center,197 for example, the court reversed a summary judgment order granted
to an HMO on a state wrongful death claim, specifically noting that the HMO
advertised its physicians as “gatekeeper[s] into the health care delivery
system,”198 and held itself out in printed materials as a “total care program
which not only insures its subscribers, but provides medical care, guarantees
the quality of the care and controls the costs of health care services.”199
The leading vicarious liability case is Dukes, which involved an ostensible
agency claim (as well as claims for corporate negligence in selecting,
screening, monitoring and supervising personnel) alleging vicarious liability of
an MCO for provider malpractice. As noted in our discussion of Dukes above,
such malpractice claims may be viewed by courts as “quality of care” actions
rather than denial of benefits (or, alternatively, “quantity of care”) actions, and
thus not subject to ERISA preemption. The impact of all of this is that
plaintiffs can now use vicarious liability theories to expose MCOs to punitive
and compensatory damages for the malpractice of affiliated health care
providers.
C. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Managed care organizations use a variety of mechanisms designed to
control costs while at the same time ensuring that patients receive appropriate,
high-quality medical care. Most MCO litigation results from the use of such

195. See, e.g., Elsesser v. Hosp. of Philadelphia Coll., 802 F. Supp. 1286, 1290 (E.D. Pa.
1992).
196. See Epstein & Sykes, supra note 186, at 639. Epstein and Sykes state:
The paradigm case here would be one in which the public is led to believe that an
impecunious independent contractor is in fact an employee of another entity, so that the
apparent employer’s assets would be available to satisfy a judgment in the event of
carelessness by the apparent employee.
Id.
197. 547 A.2d 1229 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
198. Id. at 1235.
199. Id. at 1232 (emphasis added). It is interesting to note, however, that this statement was
made in a marketing document aimed at employers, and not plan members. Id.
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mechanisms (for example, use of utilization review systems to ensure that
medical care is necessary; establishment of protocols for pre-authorization of
medical services, and financial incentives paid to physicians for reducing
costs).
When use of cost-control mechanisms results in denial of necessary
medical care, MCOs can, in certain instances, be sued under a theory of
vicarious liability. It is generally well-established that ERISA preemption is
not applicable in medical malpractice (or “quality of care”) cases.200
If an MCO’s own corporate/administrative malfeasance leads to patient
injury, MCOs could be subject to suit under various direct liability theories.
However, as addressed previously, direct liability is still the exception rather
than the rule (despite apparent trends indicating that this may not be the case
for long), so plaintiffs face the hurdle of overcoming ERISA’s preemption
clause which was designed to provide health care plans with freedom in
administrative decision-making.201
One more theory of MCO liability used by plaintiffs in their attempts to
circumvent ERISA preemption of state law is that of breach of fiduciary
duty.202 In furtherance of its stated purpose of establishing uniform rules for
benefit plan administration, ERISA includes certain fiduciary duty
provisions.203 For a plaintiff alleging breach of fiduciary duty to succeed in a
case against an MCO, the plaintiff must establish that: (1) the MCO is a health
plan fiduciary; (2) the MCO breached its fiduciary duty, and (3) “that a
cognizable injury resulted.”204
Fiduciary responsibility under ERISA is simply stated. The statute
provides that fiduciaries shall discharge their duties with respect to a health
plan “solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries.”205 A fiduciary
is required to discharge his duties with respect to a benefit plan for the
exclusive purpose of (1) providing benefits to participants and their
beneficiaries, and (2) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the
benefit plan.206 In addition, fiduciaries must discharge their duties “with the
care, skill, prudence, and diligence . . . that a prudent man acting in a like
capacity . . . would use in the conduct of [a similar plan].”207
All of this, of course, begs the questions of whether an MCO can be
considered a plan fiduciary under ERISA and, if so, what are the practical
200.
1995).
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

See, e.g., Dukes v. United States Health Care Systems of Pa., Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir.
Edward P. Richards, Pre-emption After Pegram, NAT’L L.J., June 18, 2001, at B8.
Sullivan, supra note 22, at 256.
See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 224 (2000).
Ochmann, supra note 13, at 602.
Pegram, 530 U.S. at 223 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2000)).
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (2000).
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2000).
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implications for such organization? The leading case under the breach of
fiduciary duty theory is Pegram v. Herdrich.208 The decision in Pegram
addressed the key issue of “whether treatment decisions made by [HMOs],
acting through their physician employees, are fiduciary acts within the
meaning of [ERISA].”209 In the process of ruling that HMOs can provide
certain financial incentives to network physicians without running afoul of
ERISA’s fiduciary provisions, the Court actually might have narrowed the
scope of ERISA’s preemption clause beyond the already stringent standard
established in Dukes.210
The Pegram case arose out of treatment provided to Herdrich by Dr. Lori
Pegram, a physician-owner of an HMO.211 Dr. Pegram found a large mass in
Herdrich’s abdomen and concluded it was an inflamed appendix.212 Rather
than scheduling a diagnostic ultrasound at a local hospital, Herdrich alleged
that Dr. Pegram was motivated by financial incentives to delay the procedure
for eight days in order to have it take place in an HMO-owned facility more
than fifty miles away.213 In the interim, Ms. Herdrich’s appendix ruptured.214
Specifically, the Supreme Court considered Herdrich’s allegations that the
HMO’s practice of providing year-end bonuses to its physician-owners based
on the difference between the cost of providing medical care and HMO
revenues created an improper incentive for such physicians to limit
treatment.215 Herdrich, attempting to avoid ERISA preemption by suing under
ERISA itself, argued that the HMO’s bonus policy constituted an inherent or
anticipatory breach by the HMO of an ERISA fiduciary duty, since the terms
of the bonus policy created an incentive for physicians to make treatment
decisions in their own self-interest, rather than in the exclusive interest of
benefit plan participants.216
After undertaking an analysis of the core principles of managed care,217 the
Court recognized that no MCO “could survive without some [form of]
incentive connecting physician reward with treatment rationing.”218 The Court
went on to note that “inducement to ration care goes to the very point of any
208. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 211.
209. Id. at 214.
210. Thomas R. McLean & Edward P. Richards, Managed Care Liability for Breach of
Fiduciary Duty After Pegram v. Herdrich: The End of ERISA Preemption for State Law Liability
for Medical Care Decision Making, 53 FLA. L. REV. 1, 29 (2001).
211. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 215.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Louis Saccoccio, Pegram’s Significance for Managed Health Care, YALE J. HEALTH
POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 195, 196 (2001).
216. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 223.
217. Id. at 233-34.
218. Id. at 220.
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HMO scheme,” and that “whatever the HMO, there must be rationing and
inducement to ration.”219 Reasoning that Congress, through its encouragement
of HMOs, had long sanctioned such rationing of care, the Court was unable to
justify application of ERISA’s fiduciary standards to rationing decisions.220 If
fiduciary standards were applied, according to the Court, any decision based on
cost rather than the best interest of the patient would be a violation of
ERISA.221 Finding that there was no reason to believe that Congress intended
such a result, the Court held that rationing decisions could not be subject to
ERISA’s fiduciary rules.222
After concluding that an MCO’s provision of financial incentives to
physicians in an effort to control costs could not be a fiduciary act under
ERISA, the Court took up the question of whether, in the course of
administering the health benefits plan, certain acts of the HMO physicians
were fiduciary in nature and, if so, whether such actions were improperly
motivated by the MCO’s monetary incentive scheme.223 In its analysis, the
Court focused on two types of arguably administrative acts: (1) pure
“eligibility decisions,”224 which turn on the plan’s coverage of a particular
condition or medical procedure for its treatment, and (2) “treatment decisions,”
which are choices about how to go about diagnosing and treating a patient’s
condition.225
In the Court’s majority opinion, Justice Souter notes that “eligibility”
decisions often “cannot be untangled from physicians’ judgments about
reasonable medical treatment,” and that “[eligibility and treatment] decisions
are often practically inextricable.”226 The Court believed that the medical
decisions made in Ms. Herdrich’s case offered a prime example of such
“mixed eligibility and treatment decisions.”227 In Pegram, the treating
physician decided that “Herdrich’s condition did not warrant immediate
action” (“treatment decision”); the consequence of such decision was a
medical determination that the HMO “would not cover immediate care”
(“eligibility decision”).228 According to the Court, the eligibility and treatment
decisions in Pegram were “inextricably mixed, as they are in countless medical
administrative decisions every day.”229

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Id. at 221.
Id. at 228.
Pegram, 530 U.S. at 228.
Id. at 229.
Id. See also Borzi, supra note 71, at 1261.
“Eligibility” decisions are also often referred to as “coverage” decisions.
Pegram, 530 U.S. at 228-29.
Id.
Id. at 229.
Id.
Id.
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Turning once again to Congressional intent, the Court expressed doubt that
Congress intended for MCOs to be treated as fiduciaries to the extent they
make mixed treatment-eligibility decisions through their physicians.230
Comparing common law fiduciary duties with the types of decisions involved
in Pegram, the Court reasoned that common law “fiduciary duties
characteristically attach to decisions about managing assets and distributing
property to beneficiaries,” while the types of decisions made by HMOs
(through their physicians) typically involve whether or not to provide medical
care.231 “[W]hen Congress took up the subject of fiduciary responsibility
under ERISA,” according to the Court, “it concentrated on fiduciaries’
financial decisions” rather than the types of fiduciary duties alleged by Ms.
Herdrich.232
Based on the reasoning detailed above, the Court ultimately concluded that
neither pure “treatment” decisions nor mixed treatment-eligibility decisions
made by physicians are acts of plan administration and, therefore, ERISA’s
fiduciary rules did not apply to such decisions.233 Only “pure eligibility”
decisions will be considered subject to ERISA’s fiduciary duty provisions.234
The practical effect of the Pegram decision is that most typical MCO
functions remain beyond the reach of ERISA’s fiduciary obligations.235 While
pure “treatment” decisions remain subject to state regulation (see this Article’s
analysis of medical malpractice actions set forth supra), state efforts to
regulate MCOs in their capacity as plan administrator are preempted.236
At first glance, Pegram appears to be a major victory for MCOs (and some
would argue that it is).237 There is debate as to whether Pegram actually has
narrowed the scope of ERISA’s preemption of state laws regulating MCOs.238
While the Court in Pegram found that financial incentives provided to
physicians to control medical utilization and expenses are fundamental to the
operation of managed care and thus are clearly allowed under ERISA, the “key
issue may be how tightly the plan controls [physician] decision-making.”239 If,
for example, an MCO utilized pre-approval mechanisms for the provision of
230. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 231.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 232.
233. Id. at 235-36.
234. Id. at 236. See also Borzi, supra note 71, at 1263.
235. Borzi, supra note 71, at 1263.
236. McLean & Richards, supra note 210, at 29.
237. See, e.g., Saccoccio, supra note 215, at 195 (arguing that Pegram “is a significant
victory for managed health plans, their network physicians, and their members,” and “does not
represent a shift in the law regarding HMO coverage decisions.”). Mr. Saccoccio is General
Counsel to the American Association of Health Plans.
238. See, e.g., McLean & Richards, supra note 210, at 30 (arguing that Pegram “appears to be
a Pyrrhic victory for the HMO industry”).
239. See Richards, supra note 201, at B8.
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medical care (or any other arrangement to prospectively affect the care of an
individual), this could be seen as a direct intervention of the MCO into medical
decision-making and would defeat ERISA preemption.240 MCO’s choosing to
manage medical decision-making, either directly or through “branded” medical
groups (i.e., medical groups held out by the MCO to be agents of the MCO),
face the enormous administrative burden of dealing with fifty different state
laws regarding medical malpractice and fiduciary duty.241
The ultimate reality of Pegram, then, is that it encourages MCOs to avoid
direct management of individual patient care, instead transferring such
responsibility to individual physicians. By shifting decision-making risk to the
physicians, MCOs can take full advantage of ERISA preemption of state law.
The question for MCOs, of course, is how best to transfer such responsibility
without losing control over costs.242
IV. RICO AND MANAGED CARE CLASS ACTIONS
When Congress enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act (“RICO”)243 in 1970, its primary goal was to utilize the law
to eradicate organized crime from the legitimate business community.
However, in the years following its enactment, RICO has been used against
legitimate businesses that were not in any way connected with organized
crime. The Supreme Court put its stamp of approval on this practice in
Sedima, S.P.R.L v. Imrex Co.,244 when it held ruled that RICO is not limited to
organized crime and may be applied to legitimate businesses.245
Section 1962 of RICO prohibits any person from, among other things,
acquiring or maintaining through a pattern of racketeering activity an interest
in an enterprise affecting interstate commerce, conducting or participating in
the conduct of the affairs of an enterprise affecting interstate commerce
through a pattern of racketeering activity, or conspiring to participate in any of
these activities.246 In addition, section 1962(a) prohibits the investment or
improper use of money obtained from racketeering activity.247
Racketeering is any scheme or artifice to defraud associated with a pattern
of at least two predicate acts, which are interrelated and are not isolated events.
Therefore, the courts require plaintiffs to show the existence of an enterprise in
240. Id.
241. McLean & Richards, supra note 210, at 30-31.
242. Some suggest that capitation payment is one effective means for transferring risk while
maintaining cost control, because physicians have a set “per patient” budget which cannot be
exceeded without penalty. See Richards, supra note 201, at B8.
243. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000).
244. 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985).
245. Id. at 499.
246. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2000).
247. Id.
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proving that defendant(s) engaged in racketeering activity. An enterprise
under RICO includes any group of individuals, partnerships, corporations,
associations or other legal entities.248 Generally, the enterprise “must exist
independently from the racketeering activity that it engages in and must have
some structure for the making of decisions and some mechanism for
controlling and directing the affairs of the group on an on-going, rather than ad
hoc, basis.”249 Typically, when the RICO defendant is a legal entity, the
plaintiff can easily prove the existence of an enterprise because “proof that the
entity in question has a legal existence satisfies the enterprise element.”250
As in every other civil action, a plaintiff in a RICO claim must first
establish standing to sue. A RICO plaintiff has standing when the plaintiff can
demonstrate that, as a result of defendant’s actions, plaintiff suffered an injury
to business or property.251 In addition, bringing suit under section 1962(b)
requires the plaintiff to show that defendant’s actions were indictable under a
separate federal criminal statute.252 On the other hand, in order to plead a
1962(a) claim, a plaintiff must allege that he or she suffered an injury as a
result of defendant’s use of racketeer income.253 In both cases, defendant’s
action must have been the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.254 Section
1962(c) of RICO authorizes recovery of up to treble damages for any
prevailing plaintiff in a civil RICO action; any person injured in “his business
or property by reason of a violation of section 1962” may bring a civil action in
federal court against the violator.255 In addition to the treble damage recovery,
a private plaintiff that prevails on a RICO claim is also entitled to recover the
cost of filing the suit and reasonable attorney’s fees.256 As such, RICO
presents an attractive and very powerful tool to use against MCOs.
With the general onslaught of litigation against MCOs, class actions suit
based on RICO claims were almost inevitable. In Humana Inc. v. Forsyth,257
the Supreme Court opened the door for beneficiaries of MCOs to bring civil
actions under RICO by holding that the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not bar

248. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2000).
249. Simon v. Value Behavioral Health, Inc., 208 F.3d 1073, 1083 (9th Cir. 2000).
250. Jaguar Cars, Inc. v. Royal Oaks Motor Car Co., 46 F.3d 258 (3d Cir. 1995) (“A
corporation is an entity legally distinct from its officers or employees, which satisfies the
enterprise definition.”).
251. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496.
252. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497 (“any recoverable damages occurring by reason of a violation of
1962(c) will flow from the commission of the predicate acts”). See also Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S.
494, 506-07 (2000).
253. Simon, 208 F.3d at 1083.
254. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 265-68 (1992).
255. 18 U.S.C § 1964(c) (2000).
256. Id.
257. 525 U.S. 299 (1999).
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plaintiffs from bringing civil RICO claims against HMOs.258 The reason for
this, the Court stated, is that RICO typically provides stiffer penalties for fraud,
namely, up to treble damages, and therefore, advances the interests of the states
in combating insurance fraud.259 The Court observed that the key factor for
determining whether a RICO suit would impair state law in contravention of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act was the existence of a state-sanctioned private
right of action.260 The state law in question in Humana allowed for private
causes of action for insurance fraud.261
Following the Humana decision, there was a wave of class action suits
filed against MCOs alleging RICO violations. The plaintiffs in these suits
have experienced a number of difficulties in maintaining their suits against
MCOs, including difficulties establishing standing, proving the predicate acts
necessary to support a RICO claim, or—the Humana decision
notwithstanding—showing that maintaining a private cause of action does not
violate relevant state law.
A.

The McCarran-Ferguson Limitation

American Chiropractic Association v. Trigon Healthcare, Inc.262 involved
a group of individual doctors and a chiropractic association who alleged
extortion and conspiracy to eliminate the practice of chiropractic medicine by
way of an MCO’s exclusion of such services from its health insurance
policies.263 The plaintiffs then alleged violations of federal laws, including
RICO, as well as violations of the Virginia Insurance Code.264 The court found
that the state law in question, unlike that in Humana, limited the private rights
of action for insurance claims, and therefore, allowing the plaintiffs to bring a
RICO cause of action against the insurance company “would not only ‘impair’
the [state] regulation but would [also] ‘supercede’ the state law at issue” in
violation of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.265
B.

Establishing Predicate Acts

In Wagner v. Magellan Health Services, Inc.,266 the plaintiff was a
psychiatrist who sued a managed care organization under a variety of theories,
including RICO, claiming that he had been “blacklisted” by the defendant
“because he insisted on procedures and treatments for patients [that the
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Id. at 311.
Id. at 313, 314.
Id. at 310.
Id. at 303.
151 F. Supp. 2d 723 (W.D. Va. 2001).
Id. at 727, 728.
Id. at 728.
Id. at 735 (quoting United States Dep’t of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 501 (1993)).
125 F. Supp. 2d 302 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
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defendant MCO] did not [want] to cover.”267 To support his RICO claim,
plaintiff alleged that defendant had committed extortion in violation of the
Hobbs Act and wire fraud by threatening to cancel a contract with the hospital
for whom plaintiff worked if plaintiff persisted in “making trouble.”268 In
addition, plaintiff alleged that the defendant MCO pressured the hospital into
using other psychiatrists, other than the plaintiff, for patients covered under
defendant’s insurance.269 The court found that plaintiff’s allegations failed to
satisfy the requirement of the Hobbs Act because he had no right to treat any of
the denied patients and thus no right to the fees that plaintiff claimed were
being extorted through the MCO’s threats of canceling its contract with the
hospital.270 The court, therefore, dismissed the case on motion since plaintiff
could not establish the predicate acts to support the RICO claim.271
C. The Standing Issue
Among the first wave of cases filed after the Humana decision was Maio v.
Aetna Inc.,272 certified as a class action on behalf of “[then] present and former
Aetna HMO members who, as a group, were targeted by Aetna and induced
into enrolling in Aetna’s HMO.”273 Although the plaintiffs alleged a variety of
“criminal” acts to satisfy the requirements of RICO, their main allegation was
that the defendant HMO had committed fraud (wire fraud and insurance fraud)
by falsely representing that its members would receive “high quality health
care from physicians who [would be] solely responsible for . . . maintaining the
physician-patient relationship,”274 when, in fact, the HMO’s policy was to
restrict a physician’s ability to provide high quality health care. In addition,
plaintiffs alleged that defendant HMO had misrepresented the extent of the
coverage that would be provided under the plan and, as a result, plaintiffs were
induced to enroll in defendant’s health care plan.275 The RICO injury,
plaintiffs claimed, was the diminishment in the market value of the health care
plans, as a result of defendants’ undisclosed agreement with plaintiffs’ health
care providers restricting coverage.276
The court disagreed and dismissed the case on defendant’s motion, and the
trial court’s decision was later upheld on appeal.277 It found that plaintiffs had

267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

Id. at 303.
Id. at 305.
Id.
Id. at 306.
Wagner, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 308.
221 F.3d 472 (3d Cir. 2000).
Id. at 474 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 475.
Id. at 480.
Id. at 484.
Maio, 221 F.3d at 474.
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not pleaded enough facts to support the allegation that they had suffered a
present injury since plaintiffs could not point to specific instances where
plaintiffs had “suffered negative medical consequences resulting from Aetna’s
enactment of the policies and practices at issue.”278
In the court’s view, plaintiffs’ claims of injury rested solely on factual
speculation as to whether their contracts would have been breached had they
requested benefits.279 The court found that plaintiffs’ property interest in the
HMO was “not a tangible property interest, like a plot of land,” but rather was
merely a “contractual right to receive benefits in the form of covered medical
services.”280 The court cited Judge Kleinfeld’s dissenting opinion in Oscar v.
University Students Co-Operative Association281 for the proposition that,
where property interests are in the form of contractual rights, economic injury
could not stem from a reduction in value.282 The court held that plaintiffs’
insurance policy was a contract, and, therefore, the court concluded that any
injuries that plaintiffs might have suffered would have to be resolved under
contract law.283 Plaintiff could only prove an injury by alleging facts to show
that the defendant HMO had breached its agreement with plaintiff by providing
less service than they had contracted for.
In Simon v. Value Behavioral Health, Inc.,284 the Ninth Circuit reached a
similar conclusion to that of the Third Circuit in Maio. It found that plaintiff
failed to allege sufficient facts to establish a claim under section 1962(a) of the
RICO Act because plaintiff could not establish that he had been driven out of
business or harmed in any direct way as a result of defendants’ use or
investment of income from racketeering activity.285 Similarly, plaintiff’s
1962(c) and 1962(d) claims could not stand because plaintiff did not allege,
and could not establish the existence, of an enterprise among the defendants.286
The court found that ‘“a conspiracy is not an enterprise for . . . purposes of
RICO;’”287 rather, plaintiff must prove that an enterprise existed independent
of the racketeering activity and had a structure for controlling and directing
decisions.

278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

Id. at 487-88.
Id. at 495.
Maio, 221 F.3d at 488, 489.
965 F.2d 783, 788 (9th Cir. 1992) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
See Maio, 221 F.3d at 489-90.
Oscar, 965 F.2d at 789.
208 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1083.
Id. at 1084.
Id. at 1083 (quoting Chang v. Chen, 80 F.3d 1293, 1300 (9th Cir. 1996)).
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The violations alleged in In re Managed Care Litigation288 are almost
identical to those alleged in Maio. Unlike the Maio and the Simon courts,
however, Judge Moreno, in In re Managed Care, found that the plaintiffs had
alleged sufficient facts to establish standing to sue under the RICO Act.289
Judge Moreno disagreed with the Maio court’s “dichotomy between property
interests and contracts and [the conclusion] that the subscriber plaintiffs . . .
possessed only contractual [interests] . . . in their insurance coverage.”290 To
Judge Moreno, “the Maio court took an overly restrictive view of property
rights and overlooked the distinction between business-related torts and
contract breaches.”291 Plaintiffs’ claim was for fraudulent inducement, ‘“an
independent tort in that it requires proof of facts separate and distinct from the
breach of contract.’”292 In the court’s view “a person whose property is
diminished by a payment of money wrongfully induced is injured in his [or
her] property” as required by the RICO statute.293 As for the speculative
nature of plaintiffs’ injuries, the court found that the tortious injury was
suffered at the time they enrolled in the plans and that it was not necessary to
wait until the defendant MCOs denied coverage before allowing the suit to
stand.294
On February 20, 2002, Judge Moreno dismissed with prejudice all of the
RICO claims for ten of the sixteen subscriber track plaintiffs.295 While the
court found that all of the plaintiffs had adequately pled claims under RICO,
the court found that the McCarran-Ferguson Act required dismissal with
prejudice of the claims of ten of the subscriber track plaintiffs because the Act
prohibits federal lawsuits that encroach on state regulatory decision making.296
Since the laws regulating the insurance industry in Florida, New Jersey,
California and Virginia, where those ten plaintiffs lived, did not provide

288. 150 F. Supp. 2d 1330 (S.D. Fla. 2001). There have been a number of reported interim
orders in this case on different issues; the latest decision was In re Managed Care Litigation, Nos.
MDL 1334, 00-1334MDMORENO, 2002 WL 1359736 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 25, 2002).
289. In re Managed Care, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 1339.
290. Id. at 1338.
291. Id.
292. Id. (quoting HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A., 685 So. 2d 1238, 1239
(Fla. 1997)).
293. Id. (citing Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1058 (8th Cir. 1981), for the proposition that
a plaintiff has standing to sue under RICO where plaintiff alleges an injury “not so much that the
contractual terms have been breached, but that the value of the contract is different than
appellants were led to expect through extracontractual statements and promises”). See In re
Merrill Lynch Ltd. P’ships Litig., 154 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 1998).
294. In re Managed Care, 150 F. Supp. 2d. at 1339.
295. American Association of Health Plans, Judge Moreno Rules on Motions to Dismiss in
Subscriber Track, available at http://www.classactioncenter.org/legal/motions.htm (last visited
Jan. 10, 2003).
296. Id.
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private civil remedies for victims of insurance fraud, allowing the RICO claims
of those plaintiffs in those states to go forward would encroach on those states’
regulatory decision making.297
As a result of Judge Moreno’s ruling, the remaining claims in the
Subscriber Track Cases are
(1) the RICO claims of those plaintiffs who reside in states that
recognize a private cause of action for insurance fraud, (2) all of the
ERISA claims alleging interference with physician-patient
communication as a breach of fiduciary duty, and (3) the
misrepresentation of “medical necessity” breach of fiduciary duty
claims of those plaintiffs who no longer subscribe to the defendants’
health care plans.298
In re Managed Care Litigation, nevertheless, remains a concern for MCOs in
that Moreno seems to have disregarded earlier impediments to plaintiff
standing. It would appear, then, that so long as RICO plaintiffs can overcome
McCarran-Ferguson Act limitations, they have a legitimate chance to receive
class certification.
V. EMERGING AREAS OF LIABILITY
Given the general trend towards increased liability for MCOs highlighted
throughout this article, certain legal theories of liability which previously
presented obstacles to plaintiffs seeking to recover damages from MCOs may
receive additional attention from the plaintiffs’ bar and the judicial bench.
This section focuses on three such areas of “emerging” liability: antitrust,
provider deselection and negligent credentialing.
A.

Antitrust

Despite the dominance of managed care in a large number of markets,
antitrust litigation directly concerning managed care represents only a small
percentage of total medical antitrust cases resulting in opinions.299 Generally
speaking, courts have applied antitrust law so as to allow MCOs room to
achieve their cost containment and management objectives.300 There are
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, Antitrust, Health Care Quality, and The Courts,
102 COLUM. L. REV. 545, 631 ( 2002) (Hammer and Sage conducted a comprehensive
examination of health care antitrust enforcement between 1985 and 1999).
300. Id. at 633. See, e.g., Levine v. Cent. Fla. Med. Affiliates, Inc., 72 F.3d 1538 (11th Cir.
1996) (involving suit brought by a physician alleging antitrust violations against a PPO for
denying provider panel membership); Doctor’s Hosp. of Jefferson, Inc. v. Southeast Med.
Alliance, Inc., 123 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 1997) (hospital terminated from PPO provider network
alleges anticompetitive effects based on fact that PPO subscribers would no longer have the
choice of the hospital’s services).
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reasons to suspect, however, that managed care antitrust litigation will increase
in the future.301
In their study of health care antitrust litigation, law professors William M.
Sage (Columbia University) and Peter J. Hammer (University of Michigan)
indicate that “waves of consolidation” within the managed care industry are
leading to levels of horizontal concentration which are likely to draw increased
antitrust scrutiny.302 Furthermore, if economic conditions continue to worsen,
MCOs may turn increasingly to exclusive provider networks, prompting
heightened antitrust scrutiny even at relatively low levels of economic
concentration.303 Finally, the expansion of managed care into smaller
communities and the resulting increase of market concentration likely will
expose MCOs and their contracting partners to additional antitrust liability.304
One recent case which received a great deal of attention involved
allegations of predatory pricing leveled by a health insurer, Coventry Health
Care of Kansas, Inc., (hereinafter “Coventry”), against Via Christi Health
System, Inc., a Wichita, Kansas based health system that owns a hospital, Via
Christi Regional Medical Center, and a health insurer, Preferred Health
Systems (hereinafter “Preferred”).305 The case, Coventry Health Care of
Kansas, Inc. v. Via Christi Health System, Inc., was heralded by some as “the
beginning of a new wave of antitrust actions by health insurers seeking to
challenge market conditions they considered disadvantageous.”306
In Coventry, Raytheon Aircraft Company, the third-largest employer in
Wichita, was informed by its health insurer, Coventry, that Raytheon’s health
insurance rates would increase 31% upon renewal of its health plan agreement
with Coventry commencing January 1, 2002.307 Facing such a stiff increase in
premiums, Raytheon solicited bids for its health insurance account from
Preferred and from Blue Cross of Kansas.308 After considering all bids and
further negotiation with Coventry, Raytheon ultimately awarded its account to
Preferred at a cost savings to Raytheon (as compared to the Coventry proposal)
of approximately $31 million.309

301. Hammer & Sage, supra note 299, at 635.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Coventry Health Care of Kan., Inc. v. Via Christi Health Sys., Inc., 176 F. Supp. 2d 1207
(D. Kan. 2001).
306. Memorandum from Gardner, Carton & Douglas, to Clients, Health Insurer’s
Monopolization Attack on Rival Health Plan Fails—Hospital’s Lower Price to its Affiliate Health
Plan Not Predatory (Jan. 2002) (on file with Saint Louis University Law Journal).
307. Coventry, 176 F. Supp. 2d at 1215.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 1216.
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Fearing that its loss of the Raytheon contract would impair its ability to
stay in the Wichita market, Coventry filed suit against Via Christi and
Preferred challenging the award of the contract to Preferred.310 Coventry
argued that Preferred attempted to monopolize the Wichita “HMO/POS . . .
benefit plan” product market,311 and alleged that Via Christi engaged in
predatory pricing by offering Preferred (a subsidiary of Via Christi) a “below
cost” reimbursement rate.312 According to Coventry, this predatory price
allowed Preferred to win the Raytheon contract.313
In its decision, the Coventry court pointed out that a plaintiff claiming
attempted monopolization by predatory pricing must prove: “(1) a relevant
geographic and product market; (2) specific intent of the defendants to
monopolize the market; (3) anti-competitive conduct by the defendants in
furtherance of [such] attempt, and (4) the dangerous probability that the
defendants will succeed in such attempt.”314 After reviewing a significant
amount of evidence, and after considering the analysis of economic experts on
each side, the court ultimately concluded that Coventry could not prove any of
the four elements required to sustain a claim of predatory pricing, finding
instead that Preferred’s bid simply reflected, among other things, Preferred’s
“lower level of physician costs” and Coventry’s “higher administrative
costs.”315
Coventry was unable to show antitrust injury by proving anticompetitive
effect in the relevant market, as evidence showed that the Wichita area
continued to be served by a variety of health insurers after the Raytheon
contract was awarded to Preferred. In fact, Coventry remained a viable
competitor after it lost the Raytheon contract. 316 Significant for integrated
delivery systems, the court noted that despite the affiliation between Via
Christi and Preferred, it found nothing unusual in the communications between
the two affiliates with respect to the Raytheon contract which would suggest
intent to monopolize.317 Specifically, the court recognized the failure of
Coventry to prove “backdoor” communications between Via Christi and
Preferred, and noted that the affiliates appeared to operate “independently” and
that boards of directors were kept distinct and separate (no overlap of
members).318

310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

Id. at 1225.
See id. at 1222.
Coventry, 176 F. Supp. 2d at 1223.
Id.
Id. at 1227.
Id. at 1235-36.
Id. at 1229.
Coventry, 176 F. Supp. 2d at 1229.
Id.
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It is clear from Coventry that plaintiffs claiming predatory pricing face
significant evidentiary hurdles in proving such claims. As managed care
encroaches into smaller markets which may be served by only a limited
number of insurers, however, it may be easier for plaintiffs to prove
anticompetitive injury and irreparable harm.
In a very recent case, Women’s Clinic, Inc. v. St. John’s Health System,
Inc., the Western District of Missouri followed the judicial trend apparent in
Coventry by once again applying antitrust law in a manner which permitted the
MCOs to contain costs and reach their management objectives.319 Plaintiff,
Women’s Clinic, Inc. (hereinafter “Women’s Clinic”), alleged that St. John’s
Health Systems, Inc., and St. John’s Physicians and Clinics, Inc. (hereinafter
“St. John’s), a network of health care providers, engaged in anticompetitive
behavior in violation of state and federal antitrust laws by integrating its health
care network through exclusive contracts and by entering into a Business
Covenant with Women’s Clinic physicians which prohibited the Women’s
Clinic physicians from “investing in or operating surgical centers, birthing
centers, mammography clinics, or other operations for which the physicians
could charge a facility fee.”320
In Women’s Clinic, St. John’s, in an effort to develop its multi-provider
network, purchased Women’s Clinic and made the plaintiff physicians
employees of St. John’s.321 Pursuant to this agreement, the plaintiff physicians
signed covenants not to compete with St. John’s if the physicians should leave
the St. John’s network.322 For several years, the relationship between the
parties was favorable, and Women’s Clinic benefited from their affiliations
with St. John’s.323 During St. John’s restructuring of its network in 1999, St.
John’s permitted Women’s Clinic to repurchase the clinic, without the surgery
center and the mammography clinic.324 As part of the sale, the parties entered
a Business Covenant which provided that “for a term of five years, plaintiff
physicians could practice medicine in the Springfield area, but could not invest
319. No. 01-3245-CV-S-GAF, 2002 WL 3199212 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 12, 2002). The court’s
decision has been submitted by the court for publication. Attorney Allen Allred, one of the
authors of this article, represented the defendants in this case.
320. Id. at *1-2. Through these activities, Women’s Clinic claimed that St. John’s inhibited
competition within the Springfield, Missouri medical community. Id.
321. Id. at *6.
322. Id. The covenants provided that the physicians “would not practice medicine in
competition with St. John’s within a twenty-five mile radius from St. John’s Regional for two
years.” Id.
323. Id. at *7. Pursuant to the agreement, Women’s Clinic had access to the St. John’s
network. Id. at *6. This access to St. John’s network provided Women’s Clinic with patient
referrals from payors who contracted with the network. Id. These payors provided financial
incentives to individual patients enrolled in their plans “to see in-network physicians and
financial disincentives to see out-of-network physicians.” Id.
324. Women’s Clinic, Inc., 2002 WL 3199212, at *6.
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in or operate any ambulatory surgical center, birthing center, and freestanding
lab or diagnostic service clinic including mammography and ultrasound.”325
The Women’s Clinic court granted summary judgment on all four counts in
St. John’s favor.326 In response to Women’s Clinic’s first claim that St. John’s
“exclusive” vertical integration is an unlawful restraint of trade, the court held
that Women’s Clinic did not demonstrate the necessary showing that the
“exclusive agreements between St. John’s and its payors actually,
detrimentally, impact[ed] competition” or that St. John’s had sufficient market
power.327 The court relied on the fact that the agreements were not, in fact,
“exclusive” because they did not prohibit its payors from paying individual
enrollees for services they receive outside the network and they did not
prohibit payors from leaving St. John’s network to contract with a competitor
network.328
The court denied Women’s Clinic’s second count that the Business
Covenant between plaintiffs and St. John’s acted as a horizontal market
allocation in violation of antitrust laws.329 According to the court, the Business
Covenant was ancillary to the Transition Agreement associated with the sale of
the clinic to plaintiffs, and was necessary for the plaintiff physicians to practice
medicine and to “ensure a successful transition from employees to affiliates”
for Women’s Clinic.330
Further, Women’s Clinic was unable to show antitrust violations under
Missouri law, which considers a covenant not to compete to be unreasonable
if, “in addition to being ancillary to a valid underlying agreement, the covenant
is not reasonably limited in scope to protecting the covenatee’s legitimate
interest.”331 The essential fault with Women’s Clinic’s argument was that its
claims were based on the erroneous notion that the relationship between
plaintiffs and St. John’s was an employee-employer relationship.332 Women’s

325. Id. at *7. Plaintiffs would not, however, be bound by the original covenants not to
compete.
326. Id. at *10-25.
327. Id. at *10-11. Since the contract is not exclusive, this is not the type of activity that
antitrust laws are intended to prevent. Id. St. John’s only contracted with 31% of the OB-GYN
physicians in the Springfield, Missouri region. Id. at *14. The court did not consider this
percentage of the market share to demonstrate sufficient market power to violate antitrust laws.
Id.
328. Id. at *12-13.
329. Women’s Clinic, Inc., 2002 WL 3199212, at *15. Horizontal market allocations are per
se illegal under the Sherman Act. Id. at *15-16.
330. Id. at *17-18. The court specifically denied Women’s Clinic’s claims that the Business
Covenant was a naked restraint on competition that was ancillary to the Employment Agreement.
331. Id. at *19.
332. Id. The relationship between St. John’s and Women’s Clinic was actually a buyer-seller
relationship. Id. St. John’s, as a seller, has a legitimate interest in protected its business interests.
Id.
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Clinic was unable to persuade the court that declaratory relief was appropriate
because Women’s Clinic failed to request that the that court construe the terms
of the affiliation agreement and that alternative remedies were available.333
Similar to Coventry, Women’s Clinic demonstrates the difficulties placed
in the paths of plaintiffs seeking to prove their claims of antitrust violations by
managed care networks.
B.

Provider Deselection

As managed care has evolved into the predominant form of healthcare
delivery in the United States, physician-patient relationships have inevitably
been affected by the business realities of the managed care framework.334 The
twin objectives of maximizing profit and controlling cost often force MCOs to
terminate physician contracts in an effort to adjust their provider bases for
efficient provision of care.335 This is particularly true in the case of physicians
who, in the judgment of MCO medical directors, over utilize managed care
services or consistently appeal denial of care decisions.336 This process of
terminating physician contracts and removing such physicians from MCO
provider panels is known as “deselection.”337

333. Id. at *25.
334. Bryan A. Liang, Deselection Under Harper v. Healthsource: A Blow for Maintaining
Patient-Physician Relationship in the Era of Managed Care?, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 799, 799
(1997). See also John D. Blum, The Evolution of Physician Credentialing into Managed Care
Selective Contracting, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 173 (1996).
335. See Liang, supra note 334, at 799. See also Julie A. Jacob, Patients Protest Loss of
Their Physicians, AMEDNEWS.COM, Feb. 21, 2000, at http://www.ama-assn.org/scipubs/amnews/pick_00/mksc0221.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2002) (describing patients’ reaction to
deselection of fourteen physicians from a managed care network in Northwest Arkansas); Ken
Terry, No-Cause Terminations: Will They Go Up in Flames?, MED. ECON., Jan. 12, 1998, at 130
(observing that “doctors have also been dropped without cause for advocating on behalf of
patients, noncooperation with health-plan rules, pursuing back payments too vigorously,
questioning fee schedules or capitation rates, and criticizing plans to their patients”).
336. Peter B. Jurgeileit, Note, Physician Employment Under Managed Care: Toward a
Retaliatory Discharge Cause of Action for HMO-Affiliated Physicians, 73 IND. L. J. 255, 256
(1997). See also David Lagala, Credentialing Can Mean Double-Jeopardy for MCOs and
Providers!, CHIROPRACTIC ECON., at http://www.chiroeco.com/article/managed-care/doublejeopardy.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2002) (stating that “deselection of specific providers can occur
as a result of cost cutting activities and/or economic credentialing resulting in a ‘weeding out’
process. Recently, MetLife cut 1,100 physicians in southern Florida, Blue Cross and Blue Shield
dropped 3,000 physicians, including the providers deselected from these and other MCOs, over
5,000 physicians have experienced deselection, potentially resulting in an over-abundance of
providers seeking membership to managed care panels.”).
337. Richard S. Liner, Physician Deselection: The Dynamics of a New Threat to the
Physician-Patient Relationship, 23 AM. J.L. & MED, 511, 513 (1997). See also Judith C.
Brostron, Physician Deselection in Managed Care Contracts, at http://www.lashlybaer.com/itn/
sfb/spring99html#physician (last visited Oct. 7, 2002).
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Provider deselection is based in contract and typically is accomplished
Such
through the use of “termination without cause” provisions.338
“termination without cause” clauses, which are almost universally present in
physician/MCO provider agreements, generally allow either party to terminate
the contract at any time without reason.339 This “at will” contractual
relationship between physicians and MCOs provides MCOs with the ability to
control healthcare costs by regulating their provider panels as needed.340
1.

Physician Challenges to Deselection: The Harper Case

Until the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s decision in Harper v.
Healthsource New Hampshire, Inc.,341 physicians who challenged termination
without cause generally were denied relief on the grounds that, absent unfair
procedures, such contract clauses were valid and enforceable.342 In 1997,
however, the Harper court reversed this trend, expressly supporting judicial
intervention into MCO-physician relationships and allowing a physician to
proceed with an action to invalidate the termination without cause provision of
a provider agreement.343
In Harper, Dr. Paul Harper, a board certified surgeon, sued the HMO,
Healthsource New Hampshire, Inc. (“Healthsource”), after Healthsource
terminated their contractual relationship because Dr. Harper failed to satisfy
the HMO’s “recredentialing criteria.”344 At the time of the lawsuit, Dr. Harper
had been a practicing physician with Healthsource for over ten years and
approximately 30-40% of his patients were Healthsource related.345

338. Liner, supra note 337, at 513.
339. See Liang, supra note 334, at 801 (citing Howard Larkin, You’re Fired; Physician
Termination, AM. MED. NEWS, Feb. 13, 1995, at 17).
340. Jurgeleit, supra note 336 (citing Alan Somers, What You and Your Physician Client
Need to Know About Managed Care Contracts, PRAC. LAW., Mar. 1996, at 15, 26-27). See also
Lisa J. Bernt, Wrongful Discharge of Independent Contractors: A Source-Derivative Approach to
Deciding Who May Bring a Claim for Violation of Public Policy, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 39
(2000)).
341. 674 A.2d 962 (N.H. 1996).
342. Liang, supra note 334, at 808 n.38 (stating that “many physicians have been reported to
be deselected but there have been no successful published challenges to these terminations except
under anti-discrimination laws.”) (citing Ken Terry, When Health Plans Don’t Want You
Anymore, MED. ECON., May 23, 1994; Julie Johnson, Hospital Medical Staffs: Next Managed
Care Casualty?, AM. MED. NEWS, Oct. 17, 1994, at 1). The decisions that granted relief
generally focused on ensuring that deselected physicians received fair procedures. See, e.g.,
Ambrosino v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 889 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (applying fair procedures
theory to a provider deselected from a managed care company and ruling that a managed care
company cannot terminate a provider for arbitrary or capricious reasons).
343. Harper, 674 A.2d at 966-67.
344. Id. at 963.
345. Id.
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The provider agreement between Dr. Harper and Healthsource contained a
termination without cause provision pursuant to which the agreement could be
“terminated by either party without cause upon six (6) months prior written
notice.”346 After exhausting internal challenges of Healthsource’s decision to
terminate his provider agreement, Dr. Harper challenged his termination in
court. Dr. Harper claimed that the termination without cause provision in the
provider agreement was against public policy, and, thus, void.347
Citing previous application of public policy issues to hospitals,348 the court
in Harper extended the public policy argument to contractual relationships
between HMOs and physicians.349 The court observed that, as is the case with
hospitals, the “public has a substantial interest in the relationship between
health maintenance organizations and their preferred provider physicians. . . .
This relationship is perhaps the most important factor in linking a particular
physician with a particular patient.”350 The court went on to rule that public
interest and fundamental fairness require that MCOs comply with an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing when terminating provider agreements,
and that such terminations not be contrary to public policy.351 Accordingly,
the court concluded that, while an MCO has a contractual right to terminate a
provider agreement without cause, the terminated physician is entitled to a
review of such decision if “the physician believes that the decision to terminate
was . . . made in bad faith or based on a factor that would make the decision
contrary to public policy.”352
2.

Post-Harper Developments

The Harper decision was seen by physicians as a victory against the
termination of provider agreements by MCOs,353 and it opened a new avenue
of MCO liability by permitting challenges to physician deselection based on
public policy arguments.354 Subsequent to Harper, for example, in New Jersey
346. Id. at 964.
347. Id.
348. Harper, 674 A.2d at 966. (The court observed that “the public has a substantial interest
in the operation of private hospitals and that of necessity in the public interest some measure of
control by the courts is controlled for.”) (quoting Bricker v. Sceva Speare Mem’l Hosp., 281 A.2d
589, 592 (N.H. 1971)).
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id. (observing that the “provider agreements must be ‘fair and in the public interest’”)
(internal citation omitted).
352. Id. See also Liang, supra note 334, for a detailed analysis of the Harper decision.
353. Mark A. Kadzielski, Provider Deselection and Decapitation in a Changing Healthcare
Environment, 41 ST. LOUIS L.J. 891, 903 (1997). See also Ken Terry, supra note 335 (discussing
state level efforts to address deselection).
354. Kadzielski, supra note 353, at 904 (citing New Hampshire Decision Could Inspire Suits
Over “Without Cause” Exclusions, 5 HEALTH L. REP., June 13, 1996, at d49). See also Liang
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Psychological Association v. MCC Behavioral Care, Inc., providers terminated
by the largest MCO in New Jersey challenged termination without cause
The court compared the
provisions in their provider agreements.355
termination of qualified physicians by MCOs to hospital termination of
physician staff privileges.356 Finding that public policy considerations were
similar in the two instances (MCOs delivery of healthcare to the public and
MCO employment of physicians), the court held that physicians were entitled
to a fair hearing before termination of their provider agreements by MCOs.357
Later, in Potvin v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co..,358 a California
obstetrician challenged his removal from a health plan’s preferred provider list
pursuant to a termination without cause provision.359 Dr. Potvin argued that
his removal from the preferred provider list was devastating to his practice as it
substantially reduced his patient base.360 In light of this allegation, the Potvin
court observed that an insurance company may, in certain circumstances, have
sufficient market power to “impair an ordinary, competent physician’s ability
to practice medicine . . . in a particular geographical area, thereby affecting an
important, substantial economic interest.”361 Accordingly, the court held Dr.
Potvin’s termination without cause provision unenforceable and ruled that
deselection, at least where the MCO has strong market presence, must be “both
substantively rational and procedurally fair.”362
It is important to note that treatment of the Harper and Potvin decisions
has not been uniform. For instance, in Grossman v. Columbine Medical
Group, Inc.,363 the Colorado Court of Appeals rejected the Harper and Potvin
public policy arguments, holding that the Colorado legislation on the issue was
dispositive of the state’s public policy.364 The court noted that the Colorado
law specifically allowing termination without cause provisions in provider
agreements between MCOs and physicians was not applicable due to its

supra note 334; Jurgeilet, supra note 336; Julie A. Jacob, Texas Physician Says His HMO
Deselection Violates ADA—AMA/State Medical Society Litigation Center is Backing the
Complaint, AMEDNEWS.COM, Mar. 24-31, 1997, at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/
pick_97/pick0324.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2002); Mary Chris Jaklevic, AMA Fights Doc Ouster:
Group Funds Battle Against Managed-Care “Deselection,” MODERN HEALTHCARE, Apr. 14,
1997, at 24; Brostron, supra note 337.
355. N. J. Psychological Ass’n v. MCC Behavioral Care, Inc., No. 96-3080, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16338, at *2-3 (D. N.J. Sept. 15, 1997).
356. Id. at *9-10.
357. Id at *10-12.
358. 997 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 2000).
359. Id. at 1155.
360. Id. at 1156.
361. Id. at 1161.
362. Id. See also Lagala, supra note 336 (discussing the Grossman decision).
363. 12 P.3d 269 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999).
364. Id. at 271.
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enactment subsequent to the termination of the contract in the current case.365
However, the court found the statute instructive in its determination of public
policy on the issue, and reasoned that the right to terminate without cause
applies equally to both the MCO and the physician.366 The court went on to
reason that “the physician cannot rely on the implied duty of good faith and
fair dealing to circumvent terms for which he expressly bargained,”367 and, as
such, the Grossman court denied the challenge of the termination without
cause provision.368
3.

Reducing Liability Exposure for Deselection Decisions

In light of the Harper and Potvin decisions, MCOs need to carefully
consider and document their deselection decisions. While the Harper and
Potvin decisions are not uniformly supported, they may indicate a trend of
increased judicial scrutiny in deselection actions. In light of court decisions
favorable to physicians, and given the very serious business, financial and
professional ramifications that deselection can have on providers (including
loss of income, decrease in established patient base and potential increases in
malpractice insurance premiums), deselected physicians are likely to
vigorously challenge MCO deselection decisions. 369
A consistent pattern of physician deselection for over utilization of
managed care resources is “an invitation for litigation,” unless an MCO
demonstrates other justifiable reasons for same.370 To avoid costly and
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id. (citing Soderlun v. Pub. Serv. Co., 944 P.2d 616 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997)) (stating that
the “covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot limit an employer’s right to discharge without
cause unless there is an express or implied promise, independent of the covenant of good faith
itself, restricting that right.”).
368. Grossman, 12 P.3d at 272.
369. Bruce J. Goldstein & Mark D. Abruzzo, Minimize Your Risk of Being Decredentialed,
PHYSICIAN’S NEWS DIG., Nov. 1999,
at http://www.physiciansnews.com/business/
1199goldstein.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2002). See also Kadzielski, supra note 353, at 905
(indicating that after the Harper decision, the “California Medical Association mailed letters to
nineteen of the states’ largest managed care health plans calling for a halt to without-cause
terminations,” arguing that “physicians on provider panels had ‘vested significant economic
interests’ in their contractual relationships with Managed Care Organizations, which prohibited
termination except for cause”); Blum, supra note 334, at 195-96. But see Liner, supra note 337,
at 524-25 (arguing that deselection can benefit the public’s interest in cost-efficient health care
and protect physicians’ reputations as it allows managed care companies to terminate incompetent
physicians without entering their names into the National Practitioner Data Bank).
370. Bruce J. Goldstein & Mark D. Abruzzo, Health Plans that Decredential Docs Must Do it
Correctly or Expect a Fight Managed Care, Sept. 1999, at http://www.managedcaremag.com/
archives/9909/9909.legal.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2003) (The authors indicate that several
factors lead to increased scrutiny of managed care companies when managed care companies
make credentialing and decredentialing decisions, including pressure from physicians wishing to
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prolonged litigation battles with terminated physicians, MCOs should first
consider whether termination can be supported by a “termination with cause”
provision in the provider agreement. If a termination without cause provision
must be invoked, MCOs need to be prepared to: (1) demonstrate objective
reasons for deselection; (2) show that the decision is not made in bad faith and
is not contrary to public policy, and (3) follow a well-documented and
objective termination process which will withstand judicial scrutiny if the
termination decision is challenged by a physician.371 It is also important that
the deselection process be applied consistently to all physicians and that a
deselected physician be given notice and reasons for deselection. Affected
providers should be given an opportunity to meet with the MCO’s governing
body to discuss the situation before a final decision is made, and the
deselection process should be thoroughly documented to prevent any future
allegations of arbitrary or bad faith decisions to deselect.372
C. Utilization Review
One cost containment measure employed by MCOs to combat rising
healthcare costs involves a process termed “utilization review,” whereby
MCOs or their agents (1) prospectively monitor and evaluate the medical
necessity of a physician’s prescribed treatments (including diagnostic
evaluations or admission of patients to hospitals and other facilities), and (2)
determine if the treatment is covered by the patient’s policy.373 Utilization
be part of the managed care company’s network, negative financial impact decredentialing has on
physicians, financial and organizational influences on managed care organizations leading to
cutbacks among contracted providers, court rulings holding managed care organizations liable for
acts of their contracted physicians, consumer pressure for stronger managed care companies
accountability and better quality of care, heightened influence of accreditation organizations,
unsettled law in the area of rights between MCOs and physicians and increased legislative efforts
to address perceived managed care faults).
371. See Goldstein & Abruzzo, supra note 370 (advising that each physician be afforded
proper due process upon deselection, that the credentialing process be formally adopted by the
managed care company’s governing body and that physician-members of the credentialing
committee refrain from voting on deselecting physicians in their specialty areas).
372. Id. (stating that “All the due process in the world cannot protect against criteria that are
wrongfully applied. Similarly, a decision to deselect for the right reasons will be subject to attack
if the process is inadequate.”). See also Susan Huntington, Provider Terminations: Strategies for
Risk Management, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., Mar. 1, 2000, at 35 (discussing strategies managed
care companies can adopt to protect themselves from possible litigation due to deselection
decisions).
373. See Sharon Reece, The Circuitous Journey to the Patients’ Bill of Rights: Winners and
Losers, 65 ALB. L. REV. 17, 31-33 (2001); David L. Trueman, The Liability of Medical Directors
for Utilization Review Decisions, 35 J. HEALTH L. 105, 105-106 (2002) [hereinafter Trueman,
Liability of Medical Directors]; David L. Trueman, Managed Care Liability Today: Laws, Cases,
Theories, and Current Issues, 33 J. HEALTH L. 191, 220 (2000) [hereinafter Trueman, Managed
Care Liability Today]. When determining whether the prescribed treatment is covered under a
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review generally is performed by medical personnel such as nurses or doctors
employed by the MCO as case reviewers, with the MCO’s medical director
overseeing all determinations.374 During the process of utilization review, if
the MCO or its medical director determines that a particular treatment
prescribed by the patient’s treating physician is not “medically necessary,” the
MCO denies coverage for the treatment.375 While MCOs argue that utilization
review is solely administrative,376 courts have recognized that, due to the cost
of many medical procedures, the true effect of the MCO’s decision to deny
payment can be to “limit the length of hospital stays, restrict the use of
specialists, prohibit or limit post hospital care, restrict access to therapy, or
prevent rendering of emergency room care.”377
Litigation based upon utilization review is an emerging and highly
unsettled area of the law.378 This section aims to briefly describe the area of
law as it stands today and to describe trends affecting MCO liability.
Most claims against MCOs with regard to utilization review are direct
liability claims.379 As with nearly all cases against MCOs, ERISA preemption
provides an initial hurdle for any suit based upon utilization review. Only
when the patient can successfully base his or her claim on the quality of
medical benefits provided by the MCO, as opposed to the quantity of benefits
owed to the patient under the MCO plan, will the suit survive ERISA
preemption.380
While nearly all courts have held that ERISA preempts direct negligence
claims based upon a denial of benefits through utilization review,381 in 1999,
the Third Circuit, in In re United States Healthcare, Inc., 382 held that ERISA
patient’s policy, the MCO and the reviewing agent will also determine if the treatment should be
excluded from the policy due to its experimental nature. See id. at 220.
374. See Trueman, Liability of Medical Directors, supra note 373, at 105.
375. See id. at 106.
376. See id.
377. Shannon v. McNulty, 718 A.2d 828, 835 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
378. See Trueman, Managed Care Liability Today, supra note 350, at 191.
379. Id. at 220.
380. See In re United States Healthcare, Inc., 193 F.3d 151, 161-62 (3d Cir. 1999).
381. See Danca v. Private Health Care Sys., Inc., 185 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999); Jass v. Prudential
Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482 (7th Cir. 1996); Tolton v. Am. Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937
(6th Cir. 1995); Spain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 129 (9th Cir. 1993); Corcoran v. United
Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992). In so doing, the courts relied on the ERISA
analysis discussed in Part II of this Article and determined that each negligence claim against
MCOs based on utilization review are in essence claims regarding the improper administration of
benefits. See supra text accompanying notes 13-106. See also Martin V. Klein, Casenote,
Quality v. Quantity: Will ERISA Preemption Survive the Third Circuit Test of In re U.S.
Healthcare?, 34 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1069, 1103-05 (2001) (discussing cases that have confronted
the issue of whether ERISA preempts direct negligence claims based upon a denial of benefits
through utilization review).
382. 193 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 1999).
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did not preempt a decedent’s parent’s direct negligence claim against an MCO
which denied benefits after utilization review.383 In this case, Michelle
Bauman and her newborn daughter, Michelina, were discharged from the
hospital twenty-four hours after Michelina’s birth as required under their MCO
plan.384 One day later, Michelina contracted a virulent infection.385 The
treating physician failed to advise the Baumans to bring their daughter back to
the hospital and U.S. Healthcare, the MCO, declined to provide a home visit
from a pediatric nurse requested by Ms. Bauman.386 Michelina died later that
same day.387
The Baumans sued the physician, the hospital and the MCO based upon a
number of legal theories, some of which were based upon the direct negligence
of the MCO with regard to its various utilization review policies.388 The court
noted that an HMO may assume both a role as an administrator of the plan and
a separate role as a provider of medical services.389 The court acknowledged
that ERISA completely preempts claims based upon an MCO’s administrative
activities, but determined that in this case, the decedent’s parents were basing
their claim upon the medical determination by the MCO of the appropriate
level of care provided and not a claim that a certain benefit was requested and
denied.390 As such, the court actually attempted to follow the quality versus
quantity distinction discussed earlier in this Article, but reached the opposite
conclusion than that of other Circuits which have addressed the same issue.391
An in-depth discussion of all issues that might arise with regard to the
direct liability of MCOs based upon utilization review is beyond the scope of
this Article. However, assuming a plaintiff can successfully escape ERISA
preemption by claiming a deficiency in the quality of medical care provided,
the following causes of action have been successfully asserted, or could likely
be successfully asserted sometime in the future, against MCOs for such
claims.392
383. Id. at 162-63.
384. Id. at 156.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. In re United States Healthcare, 193 F.3d at 156.
388. See id. at 155-57.
389. Id. at 162.
390. See id. at 163.
391. See cases cited supra note 381 and accompanying text.
392. See generally Trueman, Managed Care Liability Today, supra note 373, at 219-242. Dr.
Trueman also provides an in-depth discussion of various other causes of action against MCOs not
related to utilization review, some of which are briefly described elsewhere in this article,
including: liability for negligent credentialing/selection/retention/supervision, misrepresentation,
RICO claims, claims based on ERISA breach of fiduciary duty and claims based on vicarious
liability through respondeat superior and ostensible agency. See id. at 229, 231-33, 234-42. See
also William A. Helvestine, Legal Implications of Utilization Review, in CONTROLLING COSTS
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Negligence

In order to establish negligence against an MCO, a patient must show that
the MCO “owed the [patient] a duty of reasonable care, that the [MCO]
breached the duty, . . . that the breach proximately caused the [patient’s]
injury,” and that the patient suffered actual damage as a result of the breach.393
Whether the MCO owes a duty to the patient depends in great part on whether
it is foreseeable that the patient may forego treatment if the MCO denies
authorization.394 Courts are likely to find that a duty exists and that the
utilization review decision is often the decisive factor for the patient in
determining whether the patient will forego treatment.395
There can be two separate duties of care applied depending on whether the
alleged negligence is due to a defect in the MCO’s procedures or in the MCO’s
substantive medical decisions. The standard of care applied for the procedural
aspects of conducting the utilization review is likely to be based on the
standard of care in the community of reviewing agents, and the “[utilization
review] procedures must be sufficient to obtain enough information to make an
informed decision and to enable a timely dialogue and/or appeal if the treating
physician or patient disagrees.”396 Because MCOs use the expertise of
physicians during utilization review to evaluate claims, the standard of care
used to judge the substantive decision of whether or not a given treatment is
medically necessary will likely be the same as for physicians generally.397 The
MCO should authorize treatment if a treating physician exercising the
community standard of care would deem the treatment medically necessary.398
Negligence is probably the most common cause of action asserted by
patients against MCOs with regard to utilization review,399 and some courts
have determined that a patient can successfully sue under such a theory.400 For
example, in Wickline v. State,401 the MCO, through its utilization review
process, allegedly influenced the treating physician’s medical judgment,
causing a premature discharge of a patient from the hospital that led to the

AND CHANGING PATIENT CARE?: THE ROLE OF UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT 169, 173-190
(Bradford H. Gray & Marilyn J. Field eds., 1989).
393. Helvestine, supra note 392, at 175; see also Trueman, Liability of Medical Directors,
supra note 373, at 135.
394. Helvestine, supra note 392, at 175.
395. Id. at 175-76.
396. Id. at 176.
397. Id. at 177.
398. Id.
399. Helvestine, supra note 392, at 175; see also Trueman, Managed Care Liability Today,
supra note 373, at 221 (noting that plaintiffs have brought direct negligence claims challenging
all aspects of utilization review determinations).
400. See, e.g., Trueman, Managed Care Liability Today, supra note 373, at 221-22.
401. 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
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amputation of the patient’s leg.402 The court determined that the treating
physician should bear ultimate responsibility for the loss of the patient’s leg,
and not the MCO, because the physician discharged the patient and did not
protest the MCO’s decision to deny payment for an extended stay in the
hospital.403 However, the court acknowledged that:
Third party payors of health care services can be held legally accountable
when medically inappropriate decisions result from defects in the design or
implementation of cost-containment mechanisms as, for example, when
appeals made on a patient’s behalf for medical or hospital care are arbitrarily
ignored or unreasonably disregarded or overridden.404

2.

Breach of Contract

Policies between the MCO and patient are contracts, and as such, the
wrongful denial of payment authorization through utilization review can
subject the MCO to liability under contract theories such as breach of contract
and breach of warranty.405 However, if the patient argues only that the MCO
breached its contract with the patient by wrongfully denying payment for
treatments that should have been covered under the policy, the claim likely will
be completely preempted by ERISA and dismissed as a state law breach of
contract claim.406 Moreover, even if the case were to escape ERISA
preemption, the damages potentially available to the patient under a breach of
contract theory are limited to those damages reasonably foreseeable from the
breach.407 Punitive damages are unavailable.408
3.

Medical Malpractice

While the entire area of MCO liability based upon utilization review is an
area of uncertainty,409 states and courts are especially split on the front of
whether MCOs can and should be liable to patients for medical malpractice.410
For a patient to successfully assert a medical malpractice claim against a

402. Id. at 811.
403. See id. at 819.
404. Id. See also Wilson v. Blue Cross of S. Cal., 271 Cal. Rptr. 876, 877-80, 883-85 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1990) (noting that the MCO could be held liable for negligence for its refusal to pay for
extended hospital stay for a suicidal patient who subsequently committed suicide).
405. See Trueman, Managed Care Liability Today, supra note 373, at 233; Helvestine, supra
note 392, at 179.
406. Trueman, Managed Care Liability Today, supra note 373, at 233.
407. Helvestine, supra note 392, at 180. However, the article does note, “[S]ince it is
foreseeable that denying authorization will result in the patient foregoing medical services, the
defendant potentially is liable for injury or death caused to the patient.” Id.
408. Trueman, Managed Care Liability Today, supra note 373, at 233.
409. See id. at 191, 219.
410. See Trueman, Liability of Medical Directors, supra note 373, at 108-16.
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defendant, the patient must prove the four elements of general negligence411
that there was a physician-patient relationship, and that the defendant was
engaged in the practice of medicine.412 The key issue then, in determining
whether a plaintiff can successfully sue an MCO directly for medical
malpractice, is whether utilization review is the practice of medicine.413
Historically, patients could not successfully sue MCOs for medical
malpractice due to the “corporate practice of medicine doctrine,” which has
been codified in some states.414 The doctrine generally bars corporations and
other entities from the practice of medicine “because only a human being can
have the [proper] education, training, and character necessary to receive a
professional license and treat patients.”415
However, the American Medical Association has stated, “utilization
review decisions to deny payment for medically necessary care constitute the
practice of medicine.”416 In recent years, the state medical licensing boards or
attorneys general in California, Louisiana, Minnesota, South Carolina and
Texas have all expressed a similar view.417 In so doing, each state has
potentially opened up an avenue for patients to sue the MCO directly for
medical malpractice. In addition, there is strong support in these states for the
position that physicians acting as medical directors in utilization review must
be licensed to practice medicine in the state and that there will be significant
penalties for those physicians who conduct utilization review without a
license.418
Many states, however, have taken the opposing view. Arkansas, Kansas,
Mississippi, North Carolina and Ohio have all seemingly relied on the

411. See supra note 393 and accompanying text (outlining four elements of a negligence
cause of action).
412. Trueman, Liability of Medical Directors, supra note 373, at 135.
413. Id. at 108. It is also important to note that in certain states which have decided that
utilization review is the practice of medicine, the MCO and its medical directors may not only be
liable for traditional medical malpractice suits by plaintiff/patients, but would also be subject to
review and discipline by the state’s medical board. Id.
414. Id. at 136.
415. Id.
416. Trueman, Liability of Medical Directors, supra note 373, at 108 (citing AMA House of
Delegates, H-285.939, Managed Care Medical Director Liability, at http://www.ama-assn.org/
apps_pfonline/pf_online?f_n=resultLink&doc=policyfiles/HOD/H285.939.HTM&s_t= 285.939&
catg=AMA/HOD&&nth=1&&st_p=0&nth=1& (last visited Jan. 17, 2002)).
417. See id. at 113-16. It should be noted that the authors have not engaged in a fifty state
research of state medical licensing board opinions or attorneys’ general opinions and have relied
upon the cited reference in this determination. There may be additional states which share the
same view.
418. Id. at 109.
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traditional definition of medicine419 and have determined that utilization
review is not the practice of medicine.420 The Ohio Medical Board went so far
as to say that “the actions of a medical director must be the action of the
corporation and therefore cannot be the practice of medicine.”421
As noted above, while most cases against MCOs with regard to utilization
review are direct liability claims, patients often attempt to assert vicarious
liability claims against MCOs for medical malpractice and negligence of their
physicians. Some courts have not allowed medical malpractice claims against
MCOs to proceed for the same reason direct malpractice claims could not
proceed: the court does not acknowledge that the MCO is practicing medicine.
As such, these courts have held that the MCO cannot be held vicariously liable
for medical malpractice, a cause of action for which the practice of medicine is
an essential element.422 However, if such a case is brought in a state which
does consider utilization review the practice of medicine, the court would
seemingly allow the vicarious liability medical malpractice case to proceed
against the MCO.
4.

Tortious Interference with Physician-Patient Relationship

In order to successfully bring a claim of tortious interference with the
physician-patient relationship, the patient would need to prove the existence
and the MCO’s knowledge of the physician-patient relationship between the
patient and a treating physician, the MCO’s intentional interference with the
relationship and actual breach of it, and damages caused to the patient because
of such interference.423 While no successful cases have apparently been
brought under this cause of action based upon utilization review,424 a patient

419. The traditional definition of practicing medicine only includes, for example, examining,
“diagnosing, operating on, prescribing for, administering to or treating [a patient’s] ailment,
injury or deformity.” Id. at 110 (citing 60 N.C. Op. Att’y Gen. 49 (1990)).
420. See id. at 109-13. It again should be noted that the authors have not engaged in a fifty
state research of state medical licensing board opinions or attorneys’ general opinions and have
relied upon the cited reference in this determination. There may be additional states which share
the same view.
421. Trueman, Liability of Medical Directors, supra note 373, at 137 (citing 1999 Ohio Op.
Att’y Gen. No. 99-044, at 5 (1999), available at http://www.ag.state.oh.us/opinions/1999/99044.htm).
422. See, e.g., Dalton v. Peninsula Hosp. Ctr., 626 N.Y.S.2d 362, 364 (N.Y, Sup. Ct. 1995);
Freedman v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Colo., 849 P.2d 811, 816 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993);
Propst v. Health Maint. Plan, Inc., 582 N.E.2d 1142, 1143 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
423. Trueman, Managed Care Liability Today, supra note 373, at 230-31.
424. See id. at 230 (citing Drolet v. Healthsource, 968 F. Supp. 757, 757-58 (D. N.H. 1997)
(tortious interference class action suit based upon materially false and misleading statements of
the MCO which compromised the physician-patient relationship); Maltz v. Aetna Health Plans,
114 F.3d 9, 10, 12 (2d Cir. 1997) (ERISA based action claiming the MCO jeopardized the
physician-patient relationship by forcing physician to either accept capitation or be dropped from
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could assert such a claim if the patient is harmed because the medical treatment
the patient actually received was inferior to the treatment he or she would have
otherwise received had the utilization review process not interfered with the
physician-patient relationship.
As noted above, litigation based upon utilization review is an emerging
and highly unsettled area of the law. Division among the states with regard to
whether utilization review is the practice of medicine creates much of this
uncertainty, although the trend appears to be moving toward treating utilization
review as the practice of medicine.425 If this trend continues, additional claims
under many of the legal theories discussed above are likely to result.
Moreover, the Third Circuit’s decision in In re U.S. Healthcare to allow direct
negligence claims against MCOs for utilization review remains the minority
view and its effect is still uncertain. However, if In re U.S. Healthcare
represents the beginning of a shift in the law, MCO liability pursuant to
utilization review is likely to increase in the upcoming years.
CONCLUSION
Given the proliferation of managed care and the changing roles of health
care providers and payors, courts struggle to balance common law theories of
liability with ERISA’s stated goal of uniformity in benefit plan administration.
MCOs play an extremely important role in health care cost containment, and it
appears that the haphazard manner in which courts approach managed care
liability has only led to increases in health care costs.
Just over ten years ago, MCOs could take comfort in the knowledge that
ERISA’s preemption provisions stood as a significant bar to plaintiff recovery
under state law for anything other than enforcement of rights guaranteed under
contracts between the MCO and its subscribers. Now, with the Supreme
Court’s decision in Rush, MCOs are faced with the prospect of having to tailor
their system-wide medical review policies and procedures to the requirements
of individual states. Of course, the Rush decision is only the most recent
advance in the continuing erosion of ERISA preemption. As noted throughout
this Article, courts generally appear more willing to hold MCOs liable as
providers of care, and have extended to MCOs theories of liability once
reserved for hospitals.
MCOs and their legal counsel would be well advised to stay abreast of
changes in managed care liability laws. It may be quite some time before the
federal and state legislatures are able to coordinate appropriate measures to
allow MCOs the latitude needed to control medical costs, while at the same
time providing the appropriate degree of protection to MCO subscribers. That
the plan; Dr. Trueman analogizes arguments made in the case to those which would have to be
made under a tortious interference cause of action)).
425. Trueman, Liability of Directors, supra note 373, at 105.
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being the case, it seems likely that courts will continue to approach managed
care liability issues in an inconsistent, piecemeal fashion.
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